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[UN]HAPPY TOGETHER: WHY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
PREEMPTS STATE LAW DIGITAL PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
RIGHTS IN RADIO-LIKE STREAMING
OF PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
by JULIE L. ROSS*
INTRODUCTION
Lovers of the music of Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley, Etta James, and
hundreds of other recording artists whose records were made before Feb-
ruary 15, 1972, could soon have a hard time hearing those great artists on
any satellite or Internet radio service.  Recently, two federal district court
opinions concluded that state laws were violated when satellite radio
broadcaster Sirius XM Radio included pre-1972 sound recordings in its
broadcasts without the owners’ permission.1  Faced with potential liability
under a patchwork of ambiguous and differing state common law claims,
those engaged in the business of digitally streaming music to listeners over
the Internet or via satellite radio may very well opt to remove pre-1972
recordings from their playlists,2 which would benefit neither the public nor
the owners of these recordings.
*Professor Ross has been a member of the full-time faculty at Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center since 1998, teaching courses in music law, entertainment law,
legal writing and analysis, and transnational legal problem-solving.  She is grateful
to Jeffrey Shulman, Julie Cohen, and Bill Buzbee, among others (you know who
you are!), for their advice and feedback on this article; to Barr Benyamin for his
helpful work as research assistant; to Georgetown for its scholarship support; and
to her family for their patience, without which this article could not have been
written.
1 See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307 (C.D. Cal.
2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, 2014
WL 7172270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014), leave to appeal granted, No. 15-1164
(2d Cir. Apr. 15, 2015).  Although the reasoning of the courts in both deci-
sions could potentially apply to terrestrial radio broadcasters as well as to
those who digitally transmit sound recordings to their listeners, this article
focuses solely on the digital performance right in sound recordings — and
to exploitation of those rights through radio-like digital streaming — and
not on any other potential performance rights that might be found to be
protected under state law.
2 In Pandora’s 2014 SEC filings, the company noted:
[P]rotection of sound recordings created prior to February 15, 1972 (“pre-
1972 sound recordings”) remains governed by a patchwork of state statu-
tory and common laws. Copyright owners of pre-1972 sound recordings
have commenced litigation against us, alleging violations of New York
and California state statutory and common laws with respect to the unau-
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When Congress first provided federal copyright protections to sound
recordings in 1971, it limited the exclusive rights of sound recording own-
ers to reproduction, distribution, and adaptation rights, and granted those
rights prospectively only.3  No federal public performance right in sound
recordings — e.g., the right to broadcast the recording to the public or to
play it in a public place such as a bar, restaurant, or stadium — existed
until 1995, when sound recordings were granted a limited digital public
performance right that applies in the context of Internet and satellite
streaming of music.4
All other public performances of sound recordings remain unpro-
tected by the federal Copyright Act and have never been a source of reve-
nue for owners of those sound recordings or the artists who created them.
Thus, for example, although the author of a musical composition is com-
pensated when a recording of the composition is played on a terrestrial
radio station or at a sporting event, neither the copyright owners of the
sound recording itself nor the artists who performed the musical work are
thorized reproduction and public performance of pre-1972 sound record-
ings, seeking, among other things, restitution, disgorgement of profits,
and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief prohibiting further viola-
tion of those copyright owners’ alleged exclusive rights. Litigation has
been brought previously against Sirius XM Radio Inc. (“Sirius”) for simi-
lar claims, and a federal district court and a state court in California re-
cently ruled against Sirius for violating exclusive public performance
rights in California. That same plaintiff has initiated litigation against us,
alleging similar violations of exclusive rights under California law. If we
are found liable for the violation of the exclusive rights of any pre-1972
sound recording copyright owners, then we could be subject to liability,
the amount of which could be significant. If we are required to obtain
licenses from individual sound recording copyright owners for the repro-
duction and public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings, then the
time, effort and cost of securing such licenses directly from all owners of
sound recording used on our service could be significant and could harm
our business and operating results. If we are required to obtain licenses
for pre-1972 sound recordings to avoid liability and are unable to secure
such licenses, then we may have to remove pre-1972 sound recordings
from our service, which could harm our ability to attract and retain users.
Pandora Media Group, Inc., SEC Form 10Q at 39-40 (Sept. 30, 2014), avail-
able at http://services.corporate-ir.net/SEC.Enhanced/SecCapsule.aspx?c=
227956&fid=9722252.
3 An Act to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation
of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recording, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
4 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336, 336 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)).
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required to be compensated under United States copyright law. This has
been true since the dawn of the recording industry over a century ago.5
Sound recordings “fixed” prior to February 15, 1972, the effective
date of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 (“1971 SRA”),6  receive no fed-
eral copyright protection, so owners of pre-1972 sound recordings must
instead look to state law for protection against unauthorized copying.
Prior to enactment of the 1971 SRA, without any federal protection for
sound recordings, the recording industry had been able to protect its inter-
ests, and thus to grow and flourish, by relying on state statutes and com-
mon law doctrines such as misappropriation and unfair competition to
prevent others from copying and selling the records they produced.7  More
than four decades ago, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a California state criminal law protecting against unauthorized dupli-
cation of pre-1972 sound recordings was not preempted under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.8  In contrast to the decades-long
protections offered by state law against unauthorized copying and distri-
bution of sound recordings prior to 1971, however, no state statute and
only one state court decision recognized any right by owners of sound re-
cordings to protect their works against unauthorized public performances
until very recently.9
5 The United States is one of only a few countries that has not recognized a full
performance right in sound recordings. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 45 & n.197
(Feb. 2015) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE],
available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-
the-music-marketplace.pdf (noting that “[o]nly a handful of countries — in-
cluding Iran and North Korea — lack such a right, in addition to the United
States”).
6 An Act to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation
of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recording, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).  As the Copy-
right Office has noted, “Why Congress did not incorporate pre-1972 record-
ings into the federal statute in 1976 is an interesting question, but neither
the stakeholders nor the Copyright Office have an answer to it.” U.S. COP-
YRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-
1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 121 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL COPY-
RIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 RECORDINGS], available at http://copy-
right.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf.
7 See generally COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS,
supra note 6, at 20-49.
8 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
9 That is, until recent litigation raised the issue in connection with digital stream-
ing of pre-1972 sound recordings. See Section I(B), infra.
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Although Congress opted to exclude pre-1972 sound recordings from
federal copyright protection when it passed the 1971 SRA,10 it recognized
that owners of pre-1972 recordings relied on the existing patchwork of
state laws to protect against record piracy.11  Thus, when it enacted § 301,
the preemption clause of the 1976 Copyright Act,12 Congress expressly
exempted state laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings from preemp-
tion until February 15, 2067, when any remaining state law protection for
pre-1972 sound recordings will finally be preempted.13  As a result, even
though most of these state laws are more likely than not preempted with
respect to any sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972,14 they are
still the only source of protection for owners of pre-1972 sound recordings
against those who seek to make use of those works.
However, the fact that § 301’s express preemption clause does not ap-
ply to pre-1972 sound recordings until 2067 does not end the inquiry about
whether a particular state law that purports to grant copyright-like rights
to owners of pre-1972 sound recordings is preempted by federal law.  In
addition to any express preemption clause that Congress might incorpo-
rate into a statutory framework, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution15 requires that state law give way to federal law under specific
circumstances, including when state laws conflict with federal law.16  This
10 Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
11 See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS,
supra note 6, at 10-17, 47-49.
12 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
13 Id. § 301(c).
14 I say “more likely than not” here because preemption under § 301 is consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis, looking at the nature of the state law at issue
and whether it addresses a work protected by federal copyright law and a
use of that work that is equivalent to one of the exclusive rights granted to
copyright owners under federal law. See generally 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 (2015); Joseph P. Bauer,
Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 3, 16-106 (2007) (summing up
the body of case law analyzing preemption of state laws under § 301 and
stating “in the quarter-century-plus since the Act became effective in 1978,
there have been literally hundreds of federal and state court decisions in
which courts have been required to apply and interpret this statutory provi-
sion,” id. at 3).  The application of § 301’s statutory preemption provision is
outside the scope of this article, as it is acknowledged that § 301 provides no
defense for users of pre-1972 sound recordings against claims brought under
state law.
15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).  The other
circumstances in which Supremacy Clause preemption applies are those in
which compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or where
Congress has demonstrated an intent to displace state law by creating so
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“conflict preemption” arises under the Supremacy Clause when a “chal-
lenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”17
State laws purporting to grant public performance rights to pre-1972
sound recordings raise a thorny federalism issue — involving an express
statutory preemption provision, a statutory saving clause, and the subse-
quent creation of a comprehensive federal licensing system — that must
be addressed by any court considering whether to enforce those state laws.
This article argues that where recognition and enforcement of state law
property rights in public performances would interfere with the rights and
obligations created by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act of 1995 (“1995 DPRA”), those state law rights are necessarily pre-
empted by the Supremacy Clause and are not saved by the saving clause.
Enforcement of such state laws would create a serious obstacle to “the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress” in enacting the 1995 DPRA.
Part I provides an overview of federal protection for sound record-
ings. In addition, the (very) brief history of performance rights in sound
recordings is discussed, noting the absence of any express state law recog-
nition of a performance right in sound recordings and only minimal recog-
nition of any rights analogous to performance rights during all of the
twentieth century — in fact, some states enacted statutes expressly dis-
claiming the existence of such a right and others expressly exempted radio
broadcasts from any criminal copyright infringement liability.  Only re-
cently, in the context of disputes over digital performances of pre-1972
sound recordings, has the issue of state protection of performance rights
arisen in earnest, and the courts that have issued initial rulings about the
validity of those state law claims did not consider Supremacy Clause
preemption.
Part II explains the relevant legislative history and provisions of the
1995 DPRA.  The 1995 DPRA established a complex and comprehensive
compulsory licensing system that was in part designed to streamline the
ability of digital radio services to have access to the body of available
sound recordings upon payment of a statutory license fee, without the
need for individual license agreements for each work.  In creating the digi-
tal public performance right in sound recordings, Congress recognized that
it was creating a right that had previously been denied to owners of sound
recordings and thus defined that right narrowly.  It also emphasized the
pervasive a framework of regulation that leaves no room for state action,
id., neither of which is argued to apply here.
17 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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importance of the careful balancing of interests and the need for an easily
administrable system of licensing.
Part III introduces Supremacy Clause preemption analysis and sum-
marizes the Supreme Court’s opinion in Goldstein v. California.18  In
Goldstein, the Court acknowledged the applicability of Supremacy Clause
preemption in the context of state laws that might conflict with the federal
Copyright Act but found that the particular California statute at issue,
which criminalized the physical copying and distribution of sound record-
ings without the owner’s consent, was not preempted.  The Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Goldstein and subsequent Supremacy Clause juris-
prudence supports a different outcome in the context of at least some digi-
tal public performances of sound recordings.  The Supremacy Clause
preempts state laws purporting to require licenses for digital public per-
formances of pre-1972 sound recordings by Internet or satellite radio sta-
tions beyond what is expressly provided for in the comprehensive and
complex compulsory licensing system established by the 1995 DPRA be-
cause those laws serve as obstacles to the purposes of the federal statutory
licensing system.
Part IV acknowledges that preemption of state law protection for dig-
ital public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings raises equitable
concerns.  Preemption leaves some of this nation’s most treasured musical
artists uncompensated for use of their works by Internet and satellite
streaming services while the authors of more current works are compen-
sated.  However, it was Congress that created the framework for this ineq-
uity by leaving pre-1972 sound recordings unprotected by federal
copyright law.  Given the delicate balancing that has gone into Congress’
recognition of a digital performance right in sound recordings and creation
of a compulsory statutory licensing system, any remedy for the inequity to
owners and authors of pre-1972 sound recordings must be left to Congress.
Allowing individual courts in individual states to craft a patchwork of in-
consistent remedies would disrupt the balance struck by Congress and in-
terfere with the functioning of the compulsory license system for digital
performances of sound recordings.  This is a result that the Supremacy
Clause does not permit.
18 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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I. DON’T PLAY THAT SONG:19 SOME RELEVANT FEDERAL
COPYRIGHT BACKGROUND AND THE BRIEF HISTORY OF
EFFORTS TO PROTECT PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN
SOUND RECORDINGS UNDER STATE LAW
To lay the foundation for the federal preemption issues raised by the
application of state laws to Internet and satellite streaming of sound re-
cordings, this section provides some background on federal copyright pro-
tections relating to sound recordings, discusses the history of state law
protections for performances of sound recordings, and ends with a sum-
mary of the 2014 judicial decisions that have interpreted both California
and New York state law to encompass public performance rights in sound
recordings.
A. A-B-C:20  Legal Protection (or Lack Thereof) of Sound Recordings
Under Federal Law and the Genesis of the § 301 Express
Preemption and Saving Clauses
Although sound recordings have existed since the invention of the
phonograph in 1877 by Thomas Edison,21 United States copyright law was
slow to recognize them as creative works deserving protection separate
from the copyright granted in the underlying musical composition.  Musi-
cal compositions (fixed in the form of musical notation) first received fed-
eral copyright protection in 1831,22 but sound recordings did not receive
federal copyright protection until 140 years later, with the enactment of
the 1971 SRA.23  States were thus free for many decades to legislate re-
garding or to apply common law protections to recorded works without
coming into conflict with federal copyright law.24  Those protections, how-
19 Composed by Ahmet Ertegun and Betty Nelson, first recorded by Ben E. King
in 1962 and then by Aretha Franklin in 1970.
20 Composed by The Corporation (Berry Gordy, Freddie Perren, Alphonzo
Mizell, and Deke Richards), recorded and released by The Jackson 5 in
1970.
21 RUSSELL SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN:  THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC
BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at vi-vii (1996).
22 An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copyrights, ch. 16, §§ 1-3, 4
Stat. 436 (1831), reprinted in UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPY-
RIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RE-
LATING TO COPYRIGHT,  BULLETIN NO. 3 (rev. ed. 1973), available at http://
copyright.gov/history/Copyright_Enactments_1783–1973.pdf.
23 An Act to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation
of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
24 See Gary Pulsinelli, Happy Together?  The Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and
State Protections for Sound Recordings, 82 TENN. L. REV. 167, 172 (2014)
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ever, were largely focused on preventing piracy — the unauthorized repro-
duction of the recordings and sale of those recordings to the public.25
Federal copyright in any given work provides a specified “bundle” of
exclusive rights in that work.  Although every copyrighted work is pro-
tected from unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and preparation of
derivative works, only some copyrighted works are protected against un-
authorized public performances of the work.26  Federal copyright law pro-
vided no protection for sound recordings until February 15, 1972, the
effective date of the 1971 SRA, but the 1971 SRA limited the exclusive
rights in sound recordings solely to reproduction, distribution, and adapta-
tion (i.e., the creation of “derivative works” based on the sound record-
ing).27  Owners of sound recordings that were fixed after February 15,
1972 were not granted a federal “public performance” right by the 1971
SRA, despite the fact that such a right was granted for virtually all other
categories of works protected by federal copyright.28  Thus, radio stations
were free to broadcast and public venues such as bars and stadiums were
free to play recorded music without seeking permission from or compen-
sating sound recording owners and performers.  In fact, they have done so
for decades, and the broadcast industry in particular built its business
model around the uncompensated public performances of sound record-
ings, with sound recording owners presumably benefitting from the pro-
motion of their recordings on the public airwaves.29
(discussing the “dual state/federal protection scheme” adopted under the
1909 Copyright Act).
25 See generally BARBARA RINGER, THE  UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF
SOUND RECORDINGS 2-20 (Comm. Print 1957) (General Revision of the
Copyright Law, Study No. 26, Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study26.pdf (providing detailed
history of efforts to provide federal copyright protection for sound record-
ings and summarizing state law protections against duplication and distribu-
tion of sound recordings, stating at 11 “[t]hese laws consist almost entirely
of judge-made common law . . . [,] differ widely from State to State, and are
often conflicting and irreconcilable”).
26 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
27 An Act to amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation
of a limited copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recording, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
28 Id. § (a).
29 See generally COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 5, at 44
(“In the traditional view of the market, broadcasters and labels representing
copyright owners enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship whereby terres-
trial radio stations exploit sound recordings to attract the listener pools that
generate advertising dollars, and, in return, sound recording owners receive
exposure that promotes record and other sales.”).
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The Register of Copyright had advocated for a performance right in
sound recordings,30 but consideration of the competing interests was de-
ferred in contemplation of the comprehensive copyright revision process
that led to the Copyright Act of 1976,31 which again deferred considera-
tion of the issue by requesting a Copyright Office report on granting a
performance right in sound recordings.  That report, issued in 1978 (the
“Ringer Report”), recommended that a full performance right be granted
to sound recordings,32 a position that the Copyright Office has advocated
ever since and that Congress has consistently refused to adopt.33
When the federal Copyright Act was revised in 1976, Congress ex-
pressed a strong interest in national uniformity in copyright laws and in-
corporated an express preemption provision into the Act.34  Because the
1971 SRA applied only prospectively, sound recordings that had been
fixed (i.e., recorded) prior to the effective date of the Act have never been
afforded federal copyright protection.  Section 301’s preemption language
thus also included a saving clause, recognizing that pre-1972 sound record-
ings would be without any legal protection at all if they remained unpro-
30 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS 3-7
(Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter RINGER REPORT].
31 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (provision on limita-
tions on the exclusive right codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)).
32 RINGER REPORT, supra note 30, at 3-7.
33 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13 (1995) (recognizing that the Copyright Office
had advocated for a comprehensive performance right in sound recordings
but instead adopting a narrowly-tailored digital performance right to bal-
ance the competing interests at stake).
34 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012); see S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 115 (1975) (“The preemp-
tion of rights under State law is complete with respect to any work coming
within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive rights given
the work under the bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights in
the work might have been.”); H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1975) (“regard-
less of when the work was created and whether it is published or unpub-
lished, disseminated or undisseminated, in the public domain or copyrighted
under the Federal statute, the States cannot offer it protection equivalent to
copyright”).  As stated in the House Report, § 301 was “one of the bedrock
provisions of the bill” that would:
accomplish a fundamental and significant change in the present law.  In-
stead of a dual system of “common law copyright” for unpublished works
and statutory copyright for published works, which has been the system
in effect in the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the
bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory protection from crea-
tion. . . .  By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachro-
nistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly complicated dual system, the bill
would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and would be
much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uni-
formity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.
H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129.
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tected by federal law and if all state laws providing copyright-like
protection were preempted.35  The § 301(c) saving clause states in perti-
nent part:
(c) With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall
not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. The pre-
emptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and
remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings
commenced on and after February 15, 2067.
The legislative history of the saving clause shows that it was intended to
allow continued protection for pre-1972 sound recordings against record
piracy — that is, the unauthorized reproduction and sale of records.  The
House Report explains the purpose of what became § 301(c) as follows:
A unique and difficult problem is presented with respect to the status of
sound recordings fixed before February [15], 1972, the effective date of
the amendment bringing recordings fixed after that date under Federal
copyright protection.  In its testimony during the 1975 hearings, the De-
partment of Justice pointed out that, under § 301 [the express preemption
of state law claims equivalent to copyright with no savings clause] as
written:
This language could be read as abrogating the anti-piracy laws now
existing in 29 states relating to pre-February 15, 1972, sound record-
ings on the grounds that these statutes proscribe activities violating
rights equivalent to . . . the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright. . . .  Certainly such a result cannot have been intended
for it would likely effect the immediate resurgence of piracy of pre-
February 15, 1972 recordings. . . .
The result of the Senate amendment would be to leave pre-1972 record-
ings entitled to perpetual protection under State law, while post-1972 re-
cordings would eventually fall into the public domain as provided in the
bill.
The Committee recognizes that, under recent court decisions, pre-1972
recordings are protected by State statute or common law, and that should
not all be thrown into the public domain instantly upon the coming into
effect of the new law.  However, it cannot agree that they should in effect
be accorded perpetual protection, as under the Senate amendment, and it
35 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012); see H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133 (1975) (noting the
concerns expressed by the Department of Justice that, without a saving
clause, the preemption language of § 301, “could be read as abrogating the
anti-piracy laws now existing in 29 states relating to pre-February 15, 1972,
sound recordings” and stating that “[c]ertainly such a result cannot have
been intended for it would likely effect the immediate resurgence of piracy
of pre-February 15, 1972 sound recordings”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 116
(1975) (stating that the saving clause in what became § 301(c) “was pro-
posed by the Department of Justice to clarify the intent of this title” and
that “Congress and many states have determined that record pirates un-
fairly appropriate the property, efforts, and capital of the legitimate music
industry”).
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has therefore revised [§ 301(c)] to establish a future date for the pre-emp-
tion to take effect.36
As the Senate Report stated:
The addition of [§ 301(c)] to the bill was proposed by the Department of
Justice to clarify the intent of this title.  At the present time, 32 states
prohibit record piracy by statute, and four more do so under common
law.  The Congress and many states have determined that record pirates
unfairly appropriate the property, efforts and capital of the legitimate
music industry.  There is no justification for exposing pre-1972 recordings
to expropriation by record pirates.37
Thus, the saving clause in § 301(c) was intended to preserve state law
protections against record piracy.  At the time that Congress enacted the
saving clause, its focus was on retaining existing state law protections
against duplication and sale of pre-1972 recordings.  It did not contemplate
that state laws would be invoked to prohibit public performances of sound
recordings, and the possibility of a future recognition of a federal perform-
ance right in sound recordings was still uncertain.
B. Long Ago (And Far Away):38  Early Cases Relating to Broadcasts
of Sound Recordings
Although there is a long history of state law protection against repro-
duction and distribution of sound recordings dating back almost to the
birth of the recording industry in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury,39 there is little evidence of any state law recognition of a perform-
ance right in sound recordings prior to 2014.40  In fact, during the years
36 H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133 (1975).
37 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 116 (1975).
38 Composed by Ira Gershwin and Jerome Kern, recorded by Frank Sinatra in
1944.
39 See Bauer, supra note 14, at 16-106. R
40 As will be discussed in Section I(C) infra, in 2014, opinions addressing state
law performance rights were issued by two separate federal district court
cases involving claims brought against Sirius XM Radio under California
and New York law by members of The Turtles for alleged violations of the
digital performance right in their pre-1972 recordings over Sirius XM’s sat-
ellite radio service. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 112
U.S.P.Q.2d 1307 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio,
Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, 2014 WL 7172270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). As of the
writing of this article, the question of whether Florida law provides similar
state law protections of performance rights had just been decided in the
negative by the Southern District of Florida. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius
XM Radio, Inc., Case No. 1:13-CV-23182, Order Granting Defendant Sirius
XM’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2015).
The district court decision is now being appealed. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 15-13100 (11th Cir. notice of appeal July 10,
2015).
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between 1941 and 2014 when radio stations were regularly broadcasting
sound recordings, state laws were not invoked to prevent radio stations
from doing so despite the absence of a license and failure to pay any com-
pensation to the sound recording owners or performers.  During those
years, owners of sound recordings and artists who performed on them re-
peatedly sought relief from Congress in the form of federal protection for
sound recordings that included a performance right, arguing the inequity
of free use of their recordings by the broadcast industry.41 The few cases
that were brought to challenge the radio broadcast of sound recordings did
not assert a right to control the performance of the work per se; instead
they were based on written notices placed on sound recordings that pur-
ported to limit their use by the purchasers or the unfair competition result-
ing when live radio broadcasts of performances by musicians were
competing with unauthorized broadcasts of recorded performances by the
same musicians.42
The closest thing to recognition of a performance right in sound re-
cordings under state law before the 1976 Copyright Law and 1995 DPRA
were enacted was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station,43 decided in 1937 after orchestra leader Fred
Waring sued a Pennsylvania radio station for playing one of his records
over the air in spite of a statement on the label of the record reading “Not
licensed for radio broadcast.”44  The use of “not for radio broadcast” and
41 RINGER REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-58.  In addition, music publishers and R
composers were actively engaged in enforcing the performance right in
compositions against radio broadcasters during this time frame.  Although
there were many legal skirmishes that resulted in ongoing antitrust consent
decree oversight of radio broadcasters’ obligations to obtain a license and
pay royalties to composition owners, broadcasters have paid performance
royalties to the owners of the musical compositions that were performed on
sound recordings since as early as the 1920s. See Bernard Korman, U.S. Po-
sition on Collective Administration of  Copyright and Anti-Trust Law, 43 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 158  (1995); RINGER REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-58.
Similarly, although the focus of this article is on radio and radio-like ser-
vices, it should be noted that musical composers were actively enforcing
their federal performance right in lawsuits through blanket license negotia-
tions with hotels, theaters, and arenas from at least as early at 1915, but
recording artists or labels did not pursue state law remedies when the same
sorts of venues began regularly performing sound recordings at events
hosted in their facilities. See generally RUSSELL SANJEK, PENNIES FROM
HEAVEN:  THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1996).
42 See Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937); RCA Mfg.
Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. N.C. 1939).
43 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
44 Id.
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similar labels in the late 1930s was described by Prof. Robert Gorman as
an effort by the American Federation of Musicians (“AFM”) to protect
union jobs for live musicians in radio broadcasts and enforce a require-
ment of union contracts with record labels.45  In affirming the grant of an
injunction against further broadcasts of Waring’s recordings, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court first found that there can be a common law prop-
erty right in the performances of “those artists who elevate interpretations
to the realm of independent works of art” and that Waring’s orchestra met
that standard because of its international acclaim and evidence that it was
“unique” in its artistry.46  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then con-
cluded that the restrictive covenant on the sale of the records, prohibiting
broadcast of the recording over the radio, was not a violation of public
policy and could be enforced in equity.47  The court found that the doc-
trine of unfair competition also supported the injunction, because the
orchestra typically was paid $13,500 for a single live performance over the
radio and the defendant radio station, for the 75-cent cost of a record, had
“appropriate[d] and utilize[d] for its own profit the musical genius and
artistry of plaintiff’s orchestra in commercial competition with the orches-
tra itself.”48
In 1939, Waring similarly succeeded in enjoining a North Carolina ra-
dio station from using electrical transcriptions of his orchestra’s perform-
ances that had been created for broadcast on the Ford Motor Program.49
The transcriptions were labeled with notices stating that the recording was
only to be used by a specified distributee and solely for the purpose of
being played on the Ford Motor Program.50  The court found that War-
ing’s rendition of the composition created a property interest that could be
subject to reasonable restrictive uses.  It also found that the restrictions
were reasonable because of the value of the performances and Waring’s
right to decide whether, when, how, and for whose advantage the rendi-
tions would be “mechanically reproduced.”51
45 Robert A. Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study
of the American Federation of Musicians, 37 SW. L.J. 697, 704 (1983).
46 Waring, 194 A. at 635.
47 Id. at 447-48.
48 Id. at 454, 455-56.
49 Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. N.C. 1939). Electrical transcriptions
are sound recordings that are (or were, in the early days of radio) specifi-
cally made for radio broadcast.
50 Id. at 339.
51 Id. at 339-40.
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However, in spite of scholarly comment favoring the result in War-
ing,52 subsequent events made these successes short-lived.  The North Car-
olina legislature almost immediately enacted legislation specifically aimed
at overruling the Waring v. Dunlea decision, expressly providing that any
common law right to limit uses of a sound recording expires upon sale of
the recording.53  South Carolina enacted a similar statute around the same
time.54  Ultimately, over the next several decades, statutes were passed in
almost every state in the U.S., limiting the ability of performers or owners
of sound recordings to seek relief under state criminal law for radio broad-
casts of sound recordings of those performances.55
52 See Note, Rights of Performers and Recorders Against Unlicensed Record
Broadcasts, 49 YALE L.J. 559, 560 n.6 (1940) (citing a series of scholarly
articles in 1937 and 1938 that approved of the result in Waring).
53 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28 (2014) (enacted in 1939 and providing that once a
copy of a sound recording is sold in commerce, all common law rights that
might attach to the recording are passed to the purchaser and any right to
restrict the use of the recording is abrogated); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern
Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414, 418 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (noting legislative
history of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-28 and finding that the purpose of the statute
was “to overrule the Waring decision by eliminating any common law right
to restrict the use of a recording sold for use in this State,” but that the
statute was not intended to preclude claims based on unauthorized copying
of records sold to the public).
54 Liberty/UA, Inc., 180 S.E.2d at 418 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 39-3-510 (2011))
(originally enacted in 1942).
55 See ALASKA STAT. § 45-50-900(b) (enacted in 1974, formerly § 45.51.010-.020);
ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(B) (enacted in 1971 as § 13-1024);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(d) (enacted in 1947 as § 41-2375 to -2376);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h(g) (enacted in 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-605
(enacted in 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-142b(c) (enacted in 1974);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 923 (enacted in 1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
3214(c)(2) (enacted in 1982); FLA. STAT. § 540.11(6)(a) (enacted in 1971,
formerly § 543.041); GA. CODE ANN. §§16-8-60(c)(1) & (2) (enacted in
1975); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 482C-4 (enacted in 1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-7606
(enacted in 1976); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-7(g) (enacted in 1961); IND.
CODE §§ 35-17-7-1 to 3 (repealed by Pub. L. 148, § 24 (1976)); Iowa Code
§ 714-15(4) (enacted in 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3748(c) (enacted in
1976, repealed by Laws 2010, ch. 136, § 307, eff. July 1, 2011); KY. REV.
STAT. § 434.445(5) (enacted in 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.223.2 (en-
acted in 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1261(5) (enacted in 1975); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 143D (enacted in 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 752.785 (enacted in 1975); MINN. STAT. § 325E.19 (enacted in 1973); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-23-91 (enacted in 1974); MO. ANN. STAT. § 570.245(1) (en-
acted in 1977, repealed by L. 2014, S.B. No. 491, § A, effective Jan. 1, 2017);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-146(2) (enacted in 1977 as § 85-606 of the Re-
vised Code of Montana 1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1325(1) (enacted in
1977); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.217(3) (enacted in 1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. §§ 352-A:2(III)(b)(1) & (3) (enacted in 1973); N.J. STAT. § 2C:21-
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In RCA, Inc. v. Whiteman,56 only three years after Waring was de-
cided, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court’s decision but refused to issue an injunction in
comparable circumstances under New York law.  In Whiteman, an orches-
tra leader sought to restrain radio broadcasts of sound recordings of the
orchestra’s performances where the records bore a notice stating that the
recording was “not licensed for radio broadcast” or “only for non-com-
mercial use on phonographs in homes.”57 In spite of these notices, the
defendant purchased records and broadcast them over its radio system.58
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, noted that although
recordings of performances of popular artists are “exceedingly valuable,”
neither the artists nor the maker of the records could “impose valid re-
strictions on their resale.”59  Judge Hand also questioned whether any
right to control performances of a sound recording existed under common
law copyright, stating,
Copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law, is a monop-
oly; it consists only in the power to prevent others from reproducing the
copyrighted work.  W.B.O. Broadcasting has never invaded any such
21(f)(1) (enacted in 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-6(A) (enacted in
1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 275.45(1)(a) (enacted in 1978 as § 275.25); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-433(c) (enacted in 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-21.1.05
(enacted in 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.52(C)(1)–(2) (enacted in
1976); 21 OKL. STAT. ANN. §§ 1865-1869 (enacted in 1975, repealed by Laws
1991, c. 82, § 8); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.873(2)(a)-(c) (enacted in 1993); 18
PA. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 4116(c)(1)-(c)(2) (enacted in 1972); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 6-13.1-15(d) (enacted in 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-950
(enacted in 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-43A-4(1) (enacted in
1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-10-5(1) (enacted in 1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-41.2 (enacted in 1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 19-25-800 (enacted in
1991); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(d)(5) (enacted in 1976); WISC. STAT.
§ 943.207(4)(a) (enacted in 1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-206(a)(i) (en-
acted in 1978).
56 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
57 Id. at 87.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 88.  The court went on to conclude that the common law property inter-
est in the performances “ended with the sale of the records and that the
restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records themselves could not
be clogged with a servitude.” Id.  The determination that the sale of the
records constituted a “publication” of the work that deprived it of common
law copyright protection was later narrowed, if not overruled, to make it
clear that the sale of records of a performance does not deprive the sound
recording’s owner of common law claims against those who copy and sell
those records for profit. See Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Re-
corder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494-95 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1950); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955);
Capital Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
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right of Whiteman; they have never copied his performances at all; they
have merely used those copies which he and the RCA Manufacturing
Company, Inc. made and distributed.60
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had reached
a different conclusion in Waring, Judge Hand, “with much regret,” indi-
cated that the Second Circuit was unconvinced by the reasoning in War-
ing.61  Even though broadcasts by the defendant in Whiteman could reach
Pennsylvania, where the performances of the plaintiff’s recordings might
constitute a tort, Judge Hand found that an injunction could not be con-
fined to broadcasting to radio sets in Pennsylvania alone.62
Judge Hand also rejected unfair competition as a basis for relief, find-
ing that without common law copyright protection for the recordings,
there was no justification for allowing Whiteman and the record manufac-
turing company to have any control over how the public used the record-
ing.  Writing for the Second Circuit, he stated:
We cannot know how Congress would solve this issue; we can guess —
and our guess is that it would refuse relief as we are refusing it — but if
our guess were the opposite, we should have no right to enforce it.  If the
talents of conductors and orchestras are denied that compensation which
is necessary to evoke their efforts because they get too little for phono-
graphic records, we have no means of knowing it, or any right to assume
it; and it is idle to invoke the deus ex machina of a “progress” which is
probably spurious, and would not be for us to realize, if it were
genuine.63
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Whiteman
case, after which no other reported decisions reflect any efforts by owners
of or performers in sound recordings to bring state law-based challenges to
radio broadcasts of those sound recordings.  As Prof. Gorman describes it,
“The impact of [Whiteman] was great, both because it was expressed in a
most thoughtful opinion by the most highly regarded jurist of his day,
Learned Hand, and because the Second Circuit encompassed New York, a
center for record production and sales and for radio broadcasting.”64
After losing the battle in Whiteman, the AFM moved on to different
tactics in seeking to prevent the broadcast of sound recordings or electrical
transcriptions in lieu of live performances by musicians, including several
60 114 F.2d at 88.
61 Id. at 89 (citing Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
62 Id. at 89-90.  “We must therefore choose between denying any injunction
whatever — since in our judgment the act is unlawful only in Pennsylvania
— or enjoining W.B.O. Broadcasting Corporation from broadcasting
throughout the Union and in Canada in order to prevent a tort in Penn-
sylvania alone.  This would be an obvious misuse of the writ which goes only
in aid of justice.” Id.
63 Id. at 90.
64 Gorman, supra note 45, at 704. R
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multi-year strikes by union musicians.65  In response to those strikes and
related efforts by the AFM that were viewed by many as strong-arm tac-
tics, broadcasters successfully lobbied for federal legislation.66  “Attempts
to impose direct pressure on the broadcasters were totally undermined by
the Lea Act of 1946, which outlawed strikes — and thus effective collec-
tive bargaining — designed to expand or preserve live employment in ra-
dio, to eliminate or restrict the use of records in broadcasting, or even to
extract performance royalties for the recording musicians for the radio use
of their recordings. The failure to pressure the broadcasters on the issue of
‘performers’ rights’ was attributable just as much to congressional man-
date as to the preferences of Mr. Petrillo [the head of the AFM].”67  The
Lea Act — part of the Telecommunications Act governing radio broad-
casting — was principally aimed at barring strikes in support of efforts by
musicians to impose limits on uses of recordings in radio broadcasts, such
as the “not for radio broadcast” labels at issue in the Waring and White-
man cases, or efforts to pressure broadcasters to pay musicians when elec-
trical transcriptions of performances were rebroadcast.68
By the time the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted, it was well known
to Congress and to all participants in the music industry that radio stations
had been performing sound recordings in their broadcasts without seeking
permission from or paying the owners of the master recordings or per-
formers on the recordings.  If state law-based performance rights existed
at all, they were dormant across the nation for the decades leading up to
the 1971 SRA and the Copyright Act of 1976.69
65 See generally id. at 704-21.
66 Id. at 711-21.
67 Id. at 784-85.
68 An Act to amend Title V of the Communications Act of 1934 so as to prohibit
certain coercive practices affecting radio broadcasting, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89
(1946) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 506) (repealed by An Act to Appeal Section
506 of the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 96-507, § 1, 94 Stat.
2747 (Dec. 8, 1980)); see also Gorman, supra note 45, at 717.  Because the R
Lea Act was not repealed until 1980, its provisions precluding musicians or
their representatives from using “duress” or “other means” to prevent radio
broadcast of recordings remained in effect from 1946 through and beyond
the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976.  For a detailed discussion of
the Lea Act in relation to efforts of the American Federation of Musicians
to protect musicians against radio broadcast of recorded performances, see
Gorman, supra note 45. R
69 See COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, supra note
6, at 44-45; Dorothy M. Schrader, Sound Recordings: Protection Under State
Law and Under the Recent Amendment to the Copyright Code, 14 ARIZ. L.
REV. 689, 693 & n.49 (1972) (describing state law protections for sound re-
cordings fixed before the 1971 SRA became effective and hypothesizing
that “there have been no cases on broadcasting of records since Whiteman
because of altered industry practice and technological changes,” with the
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Thus, when Congress opted to exclude pre-1972 sound recordings
from federal protection and left them to the states to protect, there is no
evidence of any intent by Congress to allow states to recognize and protect
a performance right in sound recordings. The debate over whether to
grant performance rights to sound recordings, which continued through
the issuance of the Ringer Report in 1978 (and continues today), reflects
the presumption of all interested parties that no such right existed.70 As
will be discussed infra in Section II(B), the prospect of state laws applying
to performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings was also not men-
tioned or considered in the legislative history of the 1995 DPRA; by that
point in time, all members of the music industry took it for granted that
the only protection for performances of sound recordings was the limited
digital public performance right granted for the first time in the 1995
DPRA.  Thus, the music industry was floored when a series of decisions
were issued by courts in the fall of 2014 that recognized the existence of
state law protections for public performances of sound recordings.71
B. Everybody Has the Right to Be Wrong (At Least Once):72  Recent
Cases Addressing State Law Performance Rights
in Sound Recordings
In practice, for many decades, state laws have presented no obstacle
for radio broadcasts of sound recordings — which constitute performances
of those recordings — and it is only recently that owners of pre-1972
sound recordings have begun to assert that a digital public performance
right exists under state laws protecting sound recordings from unautho-
rized reproductions. In 2013, two decades after satellite radio companies
first began digitally performing sound recordings over their services, the
first of several related lawsuits were filed by owners of pre-1972 record-
decline of “live” radio performances by musicians making unfair competi-
tion claims inapplicable).
70 RINGER REPORT, supra note 30; see also Note, Performers’ Rights and Copy- R
right: The Protection of Sound Recordings from Modern Pirates, 59 CAL. L.
REV. 548, 573 (1971) (describing the 1967 Senate subcommittee hearings on
the copyright revision and “a rather massive effort” by interested parties to
include a performance right in sound recordings, who argued that “the com-
mercial value of a musical composition is created largely by the record man-
ufacturer and the performing artists, who get no compensation from the use
of their records by radio stations and other users”).
71 See, e.g., Stephen Carlisle, Flo and Eddie v. Sirius XM Radio: Have Two Hip-
pies from the 60’s Just Changed the Course of Broadcast Music? (Oct. 2,
2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/flo-and-eddie-v-sirius-xm-radio.
72 Composed by Sammy Cahn and Jimmy Van Heusen, recorded by Frank
Sinatra in 1965.
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ings, alleging that those digital performances violated state law.73  The de-
sire by owners of pre-1972 recordings to seek compensation for digital
public performances on streaming services is understandable:  digital
streaming revenues for sound recording owners has grown geometrically
over the past decade, while income from sales of recordings, including dig-
ital downloads, has decreased over time.74  Although owners of pre-1972
recordings thus continue to earn revenue from any sales — in the form of
physical albums or CDs or in the form of digital downloads on services
like iTunes and Amazon — of their works, in the absence of federal or
state law recognition of public performance rights in those works, they will
be unable to profit from uses of their works in the digital streaming mar-
ketplace by webcasters, satellite radio, and Internet streaming services.
Two recent federal district court cases, one interpreting California law
and one interpreting New York law, have found those state laws to pro-
vide owners of pre-1972 sound recordings a performance right in those
sound recordings that was violated by Sirius XM Radio when it digitally
streamed the recordings on its Internet radio service.75
In the California case, the entity owning the pre-1972 sound record-
ings by the band The Turtles, Flo & Eddie, Inc. (“Flo & Eddie”), sought
summary judgment on liability for its state law causes of action arising out
of Sirius XM’s broadcasting and streaming of sound recordings to sub-
scribers, as well as making reproductions of sound recordings in the opera-
tion of its business.76  Finding questions of fact that precluded summary
judgment relating to the alleged reproductions of Flo & Eddie’s sound
recordings made by Sirius XM, the court granted the motion on all causes
of action, but solely with respect to the performance of the sound record-
ings at issue by Sirius XM through its digital broadcasting and streaming
73 See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307
(C.D. Cal. 2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ.
5784, 2014 WL 7172270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
74 Compare SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE FACT SHEET (including
Chart of Payments 2005–2014), available at http://www.soundexchange.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SX-Fact-Sheet_2.13.151.pdf (last updated Feb.
13, 2015) (showing collected revenues from online streaming of sound re-
cordings increasing from $20 million in 2005 to $773 million in 2014), with
Scope of the Problem, RIAA, available at http://www.riaa.com/physicalpira
cy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem (last visited
Mar. 18, 2015) (stating that U.S. music sales dropped 53%, from $14.6 bil-
lion in 1999 to $7.0 billion in 2013).
75 Flo & Eddie, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307; Flo & Eddie, Inc., 2014 WL 7172270.
76 Flo & Eddie, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1310. The plaintiff asserted claims based
upon California Civil Code § 980(a)(2) (California’s copyright statute), Cal-
ifornia Business & Professional Code §§ 17200 et seq. (California’s unfair
competition law), and common law claims of conversion and
misappropriation).
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services.77 In finding liability on all four causes of action, the court relied
on its interpretation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), the state statute
governing copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings, as encompassing the
grant of an exclusive right to publicly perform those sound recordings.78
The pertinent language in § 980(a)(2) of the California Civil Code
provides:
The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound re-
cording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972, has an exclusive owner-
ship therein until February 15, 2047, as against all persons except one who
independently makes or duplicates another sound recording that does not
directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in such prior re-
cording, but consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds,
even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained in the
prior sound recording.79
The court found that because the “exclusive ownership” provision of the
California statute listed only one exception — permitting independent fix-
ation of imitations of the sound recording — the legislature must have
intended no other limitations of the ownership right in sound recordings.80
Although the court found the statutory language to be unambiguous, it
also concluded that its interpretation of that language was consistent with
the legislative history of the statute.  That history showed that the legisla-
ture considered the 1976 Copyright Act in drafting its 1982 amendments to
§ 980(a)(2), and thus the court found that the legislature was likely aware
of 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)’s exclusion of performance rights from the rights
granted to owners of sound recordings under federal law, yet chose to in-
clude no such limitation in its revisions to § 980(a)(2).81
77 Id. at 1318.
78 Id. at 1312-14, 1317.
79 CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2).
80 Flo & Eddie, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1311.
81 Id. at 1314.  The California Flo & Eddie opinion also noted that two courts had
previously discussed  a performance right in sound recordings under
§ 980(a)(2), citing Capital Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d
1198 (C.D. Cal. 2010) and Bagdasarian Prods., LLC v. Capitol Records,
Inc., No. B217960, 2010 WL 3245795 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2010) and as-
serting that both opinions supported its interpretation of § 980(a)(2) as in-
cluding a performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings. Id. at 1314.
However, neither of these 2010 opinions expressly tackled the question of
state law protection for digital performances, let alone whether the federal
compulsory licensing system for digital radio services conflicted with any
such state law protection. Bagdasarian’s use of an example that assumed a
state law performance right in a recording if “played during a live stage
show” was pure dicta, without any analytical component or support, and did
not implicate digital performances. Id. at 1315. BlueBeat did not expressly
analyze the question of whether California law grants a performance right
to owners of sound recordings; the court simply stated that the defendant
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In the New York Flo & Eddie case, the plaintiff brought a putative
class action against Sirius XM Radio, alleging claims arising under New
York common law copyright and unfair competition laws.82  Sirius XM
moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that New York common
law copyright protection for pre-1972 recordings afforded no exclusive
right of public performance.83  The court denied the motion, finding that
New York common law protecting pre-1972 sound recordings was broad
enough to include a public performance right.  The court thus issued an
order to show cause why summary judgment on liability should not be
entered in favor of the plaintiff.84  In so doing, the court recognized that
whether New York common law copyright includes a public performance
right was a question “of first impression, and one that has profound eco-
nomic consequences for the recording industry and both the analog and
digital broadcast industries.”85  In spite of the court’s acknowledgment
that its ruling would disrupt the settled expectations of the industry, it rea-
soned that New York’s common law copyright protection for works other
than sound recordings encompassed the full “bundle” of rights, including
performance rights where applicable.  Thus, the court saw no reason to
infer that those rights would be more limited for sound recordings in spite
of the absence of any judicial recognition of a performance right in sound
recordings in the preceding decades and the absence of any efforts by
owners of sound recordings to enforce such a common law right.86
Litigation in these and some of the related cases is ongoing. The
plaintiff in both the California and New York Flo & Eddie cases has
sought class certification on behalf of similarly-situated owners of pre-1972
conceded that it reproduced, sold, and publicly performed the pre-1972 re-
cordings at issue without authorization and concluded that, as a result, it
was “liable for misappropriation, unfair competition, and conversion.”  765
F. Supp. 2d at 1206.  The sole authority cited for that conclusion was A & M
Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), but the
court  mischaracterized the holding in A & M Records by stating that it held
that duplication, sale, and performance of a sound recording without au-
thorization is a classic example of misappropriation, unfair competition, and
conversion. Capital Records, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. In fact, A & M
Records involved classic record piracy through unauthorized duplication
and sale of records and neither mentioned nor reached any holding about
performances of sound recordings. A & M Records, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 394-
401.
82 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, 2014 WL 7172270
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
83 Id. at *8.
84 Id. at *1, *10-*15.
85 Id. at *10.
86 Id. at *10-*14.
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recordings.87  As of the writing of this article, the federal court in Califor-
nia had denied leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the ruling on liabil-
ity and was proceeding with the request to certify a class action, but the
New York court granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal and proceed-
ings were suspended while the Second Circuit hears the appeal.88  Law-
suits alleging similar state law performance rights claims for pre-1972
recordings have also been filed against Pandora Media, Inc. by both Flo &
Eddie and the major labels.89
The major record labels had initiated a California state court proceed-
ing against Sirius XM that relied on the reasoning in the California federal
Flo & Eddie case to find a state performance right in sound recordings;
although the California Supreme Court denied a petition to review that
decision, the case was recently settled for $210 million.90 In addition, at
87 See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., CV 13-5693, Order Deny-
ing Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal (Nov. 20, 2104); Flo & Ed-
die, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., CV 13-5693, Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration (Feb. 19, 2015); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,
No. 13 Civ. 5784, Decision and Order (Jan. 15, 2015) (deferring ruling on
merits of Flo & Eddie’s motion for summary judgment on liability pending
determination of class action certification).
88 See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, Decision
and Order Certifying Interlocutory Appeal (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015), leave
to appeal granted, No. 15-497 (2d Cir. April 15, 2015); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., CV 13-5693, Order Denying Motion to Certify for
Interlocutory Appeal (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (setting schedule for discov-
ery for class certification and damages).  Sirius XM filed a nearly identical
motion for summary judgment as to liability in a Florida federal case in
2014, and on June 22, 2015 the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida granted Sirius XM’s motion, concluding that Florida
law did not include an express public performance right and that the issue is
one “for the Florida legislature.”  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio,
Inc., No. 13-23182-CIV, 2015 WL 3852692, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2015).
89 See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-07648 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 14, 2014).  In the Pandora litigation in the Central District of Cali-
fornia, Pandora filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to California’s anti-
SLAPP statute.  The court denied the motion, finding that although Pan-
dora’s conduct was protected, speech-related activity under the anti-SLAPP
statute, Flo & Eddie had demonstrated that its state law performance right
claims were “sufficiently meritorious” to survive the motion.  Flo & Eddie,
Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-07648, Minute Order Denying Pan-
dora’s Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015).  That rul-
ing has since been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Pandora Media, Inc., No. 15-55287 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2015).
90 Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC920581, Court’s Ruling
(L.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2014) (granting reconsideration of Oct. 14, 2014, Or-
der Granting Capitol Record’s Motion for a Jury Instruction but reaffirming
ruling that California law protected performance rights in sound recordings;
also granting certification of interlocutory appeal), petition for review de-
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least one state legislature is considering enacting a law that would provide
owners of pre-1972 sound recordings with an exclusive performance right
similar to that recognized by the Central District of California in the Flo &
Eddie litigation.91 Thus, in spite of the recent settlement between Sirius
XM and the major labels, the issue of whether state laws provide owners
of pre-1972 recordings with remedies against Internet and satellite stream-
ing services is still hotly in dispute.
The rulings in the California and New York cases have been widely
acknowledged as potentially devastating to Internet and satellite radio ser-
vices.92 They also serve to provide greater bargaining power to owners of
nied, No. S224881 (Cal. Apr. 29, 2015).  In the state court proceedings, the
Los Angeles Superior Court initially granted Capitol Records’ motion for a
jury instruction regarding state law protection of performance rights in
sound recordings, relying on the Central District of California opinion in
the Flo & Eddie case to find that such protection existed under California
law — but agreed with Sirius XM that any finding of liability would be
premature.  Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC920581,
Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter:  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jury Instruction
(L.A. Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 2014). After the Superior Court granted Sirius
XM’s motion for certification for interlocutory appeal in December 2014,
the California Court of Appeal summarily denied the writ of mandate, Sir-
ius XM Radio, Inc. v. S.C.L.A., No. B260717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d App. Dist.
Feb. 23, 2015), and Sirius XM filed a petition for review with the California
Supreme Court that was denied in April of 2015.  Sirius XM Radio, Inc. v.
S.C. (Capitol Records), No. S224881 (Cal. Apr. 29, 2015).  In late June 2015,
the parties announced a settlement of the California state litigation between
the major labels and Sirius XM, in which Sirius XM has agreed to pay $210
million to the labels, and the labels have consented to continued streaming
of their pre-1972 recordings through 2017, with renewal rights subject to
mediation. See Ben Sisario, SiriusXM Settles a Lawsuit on Songs Made
Before ’72, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2015, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/06/27/business/sirius-xm-settles-royalty-dispute-over-old-record-
ings.html?_r=0.
91 See SB 1287, 28th Leg. (Haw. 2015), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2015/bills/SB1287_SD2_.htm (proposing to make it a misdemeanor
to violate the exclusive rights of a pre-1972 sound recording owner).
92 See, e.g., Carlisle, supra note 71; Lee Gesmer, The Kerfuffle Over Copyrights in
Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, Mass Law Blog (Oct. 22, 2014), http://masslaw-
blog.com/copyright/the-kerfuffle-over-copyrights-in-pre-1972-sound-record-
ings; Lee Gesmer, Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM – The Other Shoe Drops on the
East Coast, MASS LAW BLOG  (Nov. 19, 2014), http://masslawblog.com/cop-
yright/flo-eddie-v-sirius-xm-the-other-shoe-drops-on-the-east-coast
(describing the second ruling against Sirius as potentially “catastrophic,”
noting that the decisions “create more questions than answers” because of
ambiguity about damages under state law, and suggesting that the decision
should add pressure on Congress to amend the Copyright Act to protect
pre-1972 recordings); Steve Gordon, A California Federal District Court’s
Decision in a Case Against Sirius XM Has Broader Implications than Just
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pre-1972 sound recordings than that provided under federal law to owners
of sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, who are compelled to
license their sound recordings to Internet and satellite radio services at
rates that some argue are lower than they should be.  Because the parties
to the Flo & Eddie cases did not raise, and the courts did not consider,
conflict preemption under the Supremacy Clause, the California and New
York federal court opinions did not undertake any analysis of whether or
how the recognition and enforcement of state law performance rights in
digital streaming of sound recordings might interfere with the federal com-
pulsory licensing system established by the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995.
II. PENNIES FROM HEAVEN:93  THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE DPRA AND THE COMPLEX STATUTORY
PROVISIONS GOVERNING DIGITAL PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS
UNDER THE DPRA
The state law performance rights recognized in the Flo & Eddie cases
come into direct conflict with the goals and purposes of the compulsory
statutory licensing provisions of Section 114 of the Copyright Act that
were first enacted by Congress in 1995.94 By the mid-1990s, the digital era
had arrived and it had become possible to make perfect copies of recorded
works released in digital format, both by copying them onto compact discs
and by transmitting them over the Internet or other digital transmission
mechanisms.  Although sound recordings that were broadcast over terres-
trial radio could be recorded in analog format and sold as a substitute for
authorized records, the sound quality of analog recordings was compara-
tively poor and degraded over time.  Record labels became concerned,
however, that digital performances of sound recordings through emerging
services like satellite radio could be captured in perfect copies and
replayed by consumers, serving as a substitute for sales of recordings.
Thus, in response to pleas from record labels for greater protection
against digital piracy of sound recordings and after repeated meetings and
negotiations with copyright owners, fledgling satellite radio companies, In-
Whether Internet Radio and Satellite Services Must Pay for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings, THE ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS AND SPORTS LAW BLOG (N.Y.
State Bar Assoc., Oct. 8, 2014), http://nysbar.com/blogs/EASL/2014/10/a_cal
ifornia_federal_district.html.
93 Composed by Arthur Johnston and Johnny Burke, recorded by Frank Sinatra
in 1956 and again in 1962.
94 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
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ternet services, and other interested parties,95 Congress passed the 1995
DPRA.96  The 1995 DPRA added a limited, digital performance right for
sound recordings to section 106 of the Copyright Act, which applied solely
to public performances by means of a “digital audio transmission.”97 Ad-
ditionally, the 1995 DPRA amended the Copyright Act to both define the
scope of the new digital public performance right and to create a system
for compensating recording artists and copyright owners for uses implicat-
ing this right.98
The new digital public performance right, as amended by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, created three different categories of digital au-
dio transmissions, each with separate limitations:  exempt transmissions
that are permitted without a license or compensation; “a mandatory
scheme of ‘voluntary licensing’ for interactive transmissions”; and “a com-
pulsory license scheme for subscription [and eligible nonsubscription]
transmissions.”99  The § 114 digital audio transmission categories are sum-
marized below in Figure 1.
The exempt transmissions, even though they are public performances
of sound recordings by means of digital audio transmissions, are immune
from liability to copyright owners of sound recordings.100 The provisions
governing exempt transmissions were largely intended to capture tradi-
tional terrestrial radio broadcasts even if the broadcast is transmitted digi-
tally, so long as they were broadcast to the public for free rather than
limited to subscribers.101
95 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13 (1995) (discussing the rationale for providing a
digital public performance right and the competing interests at stake).
96 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
97 Id.  As part of the legislative tradeoff that enabled passage of the DPRA, the
statute expressly recognized that the new digital performance right in sound
recordings would not extend to performances over terrestrial radio. 17
U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(1), (j)(3) (2012).
98 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).
99 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.22[A][1] (recognizing in a footnote
the oxymoronic nature of the characterization of the second category as a
mandatory scheme of “voluntary” licensing).
100 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012).
101 Both the Copyright Office and the courts have since made it clear that the
“exemption” for terrestrial radio does not apply to digital streaming of ter-
restrial radio broadcasts over the Internet. See, e.g., Public Performance of
Sound Recordings: Definition of Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11,
2000); Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003).  The
practical effect of this exemption and subsequent judicial limitation is that
when traditional radio stations simultaneously broadcast a program over
the air and over a digital Internet stream, those stations are only required to
pay royalties to sound recording owners and artists for the digital transmis-
sion of the recordings.  Other exempt transmissions include retransmissions
of nonsubscription broadcasts (even if through a subscription service), 17
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Figure 1: Categories of Digital Audio Transmissions Covered by § 114
At the other end of the spectrum are interactive services, which must
negotiate directly with copyright owners and obtain a license before pub-
licly performing a sound recording via a digital audio transmission.102  An
U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(B) (2012); prior or simultaneous transmissions incidental
to an exempt transmission (such as network feed), id. § 114(d)(1)(C)(i);
transmissions within a business establishment (i.e., “storecasts”), id.
§ 114(d)(1)(C)(ii); “through to the listener” transmissions where the trans-
mitting entity has a public performance license and has authorized retrans-
mission of the transmissions to its customers  (such as in the context of
cable systems), id. § 114(d)(1)(C)(iii); and transmissions to a business estab-
lishment for use in the ordinary course of its business (such as for back-
ground music in restaurants or stores), id. § 114(d)(1)(C)(iv).  Although a
detailed discussion of exempt transmissions is outside the scope of this arti-
cle, Congress has demonstrated a clear intent in the context of exempt
transmissions that no liability attach to the specified activities.  Because any
efforts to enforce state law performance rights would interfere with that
intent, the preemption arguments detailed below in the context of transmis-
sions qualifying for the compulsory statutory license would likely apply
equally — or even more strongly — in the context of exempt transmissions
under § 114.
102 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3) (2012).
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interactive service is defined as a service that “enables a member of the
public to receive a transmission of a program specifically created for the
recipient,” including one allowing a member of the public to receive, “on
request, a transmission of a particular sound recording. . . .”103  Owners of
sound recordings were given the greatest control over digital public per-
formances of their works by interactive services because of the concern
that these sorts of “on-demand” services would have the strongest substi-
tutional impact on sales; if listeners could dictate the content of the stream
to be able to listen to whatever recordings they desired, then there would
be no need for them to purchase the recording.104
Finally, and most pertinent to the recent New York and California
litigation involving Sirius XM, § 114 created a compulsory statutory licens-
ing system for qualifying “non-interactive” digital audio transmissions of
sound recordings.105  As a general matter, compulsory statutory licenses
have been created by Congress with regard to specific uses of specific
types of works to allow for a more efficient mechanism in both guarantee-
ing public access to works and compensating copyright owners.106  Such
103 Id. § 114(j)(7).  The full definition of an “interactive service” is:
one that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a
program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission
of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program,
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.  The ability of individu-
als to request that a particular sound recordings be performed for recep-
tion by the public at large, or in the case of a subscription service, by all
subscribers of the service, does not make a service interactive, if the pro-
gramming on each channel of the service does not substantially consist of
sound recordings that are performed within 1 hour of the request or at a
time designated by either the transmitting entity or the individual making
such request.  If an entity offers both interactive and noninteractive ser-
vices (either concurrently or at different times), the noninteractive com-
ponent shall not be treated as part of an interactive service.
Id.
104 See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir.
2009) (noting that Congress intended the digital public performance right to
be “narrow” and that the grant of the right was motivated by the legitimate
concerns of record companies about the potential for interactive, on-de-
mand webcasting to substantially reduce record sales).
105 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).
106 The first compulsory license created by Congress under its constitutional au-
thority to enact legislation to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, was a mechanical license created under the
Copyright Act of 1909 that permitted mechanical recording of a composi-
tion if certain conditions were met, including payment of a statutory royalty
to the owner of the composition. See HARRY G. HENN, THE COMPULSORY
LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 n.13 (Comm. Print
1956) (General Revision of the Copyright Law, Study No. 5, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study5.pdf (discussing section 1(e)
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licenses impose a limitation on both the owner’s ability to control access to
the category of works and on the owner’s ability to set a price for use of
those works by others.107  As a result, statutory licenses inevitably reflect
both a considered balancing by Congress of the rights of copyright owners
and the rights of those who wish to use the works.  They also typically
encompass a carefully crafted system to define who qualifies for the li-
cense and how royalties will be determined and paid.108  These character-
istics of a statutory license are all reflected in the 1995 DPRA, whereby
Congress created an addition to the existing bundle of federal property
rights in sound recordings for the benefit of copyright owners — and for
the benefit of musical performing artists109 — but ensured access to these
works by licensees in narrowly defined circumstances through a compul-
sory statutory license.
of the 1909 Act).  Today, Title 17 of the U.S. Code establishes several differ-
ent types of statutory licenses, many of which apply to musical compositions
or sound recordings and their uses in various media, which are administered
in part by the Licensing Division of the Copyright Office. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 111(2012) (secondary transmissions by cable systems); id. § 112
(ephemeral recordings); id. § 114 (public performance of sound recordings
by means of a digital audio transmission); id. § 115 (use of musical composi-
tion in making and distributing phonorecords); id. § 118 (use of certain
works in connection with noncommercial broadcasting); id. § 119 (secon-
dary transmissions by satellite carriers); id. § 122 (secondary transmissions
by satellite carriers for local retransmissions); id. § 1001 et seq. (distribution
of digital audio recording devices and media).
107 See generally Scott L. Bach, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Li-
censes: Toward A Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379
(1986) (criticizing the mechanical license as providing composers with inad-
equate control over their works and inadequate compensation for uses of
their compositions in sound recordings).
108 Unlike the statutory “mechanical” license for use of musical compositions in
sound recordings, which specifies the statutory royalty that must be paid
and has been amended over the years to (modestly) increase the statutory
rate, see 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012), the Copyright Act and accompanying regu-
lations generally do not set the specific license rate that must be paid under
the section 114 compulsory license.  Instead, the DPRA set up a process
through which rates and terms are set for specific time periods, subject to
periodic adjustment at regular intervals, either by agreement of the differ-
ent classes of users described under the statute or, failing agreement, by the
Copyright Royalty Board, a three-judge panel housed within the U.S. Li-
brary of Congress. Id. §§ 801(a), (b)(1).
109 Many recording agreements vest ownership of the resulting sound recordings
in the record label, not in the recording artists who perform on those sound
recordings. Section 114 is a fairly unique aspect of federal copyright law in
its express grant of compensation to someone other than the registered cop-
yright owner for uses of the copyrighted work.
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This careful balancing in the drafting of statutory license provisions
adopted under the DPRA is reflected both in the detailed provisions of
Section 114 of the Copyright Act and in the legislative history of the
statute.
A. All Along the Watchtower:110 Statutory Licensing Provisions of
§ 114
The statutory license established by § 114 is precisely tailored to ac-
complish its intended purpose: to authorize qualifying, radio-like digital
services that perform a variety of sound recordings selected by the service
(rather than by users) to digitally perform those sound recordings without
a license from the copyright owners, provided that a statutory royalty is
paid to the designated collective.111  Section 114(d) specifically sets forth
the limitations on the digital public performance right in sound recordings
established by the DPRA in § 106(6), including the creation of a statutory
license for certain types of digital audio services112 making non-interac-
tive113 public performances of sound recordings that meet specified eligi-
110 Composed by Bob Dylan; recorded by Jimi Hendrix from January through
June 1968, starting in London and completing the final master recording in
New York.
111 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16, 24 (1995). For a relatively easy to comprehend
summary of the nuances of section 114’s distinctions between interactive
and non-interactive services and rationale for providing different rate-set-
ting standards for different types of services, see COPYRIGHT AND THE MU-
SIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 5, at 46-52.
112 The statutory license identifies several large categories of platforms and ser-
vice types that are potentially eligible for the license under 114(d)(2), in-
cluding “eligible nonsubscription transmission” services (i.e.,
nonsubscription “webcasting”); “new subscription services” (i.e., subscrip-
tion webcasting and music channels over cable and satellite television that
would come into existence after 1995); “preexisting satellite digital audio
radio services” or “SDARS” (i.e., today’s combined service known as Sirius
XM); and “preexisting subscription services” (i.e., subscription digital radio
services over cable and satellite television that were in existence in 1995,
such MusicChoice and Muzak).  Each of these different categories of licen-
sees may be subject to different royalty rates and conditions pursuant to the
statutory license, and each may be subject to different license terms under
the mechanisms set up for setting rates under the statute. See 2015 Rates,
SOUNDEXCHANGE.COM (has links to rate schedules), http://www
.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates (last visited March 19, 2015).
113 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(i) (2012). The limitation of the compulsory statutory li-
cense to a set of carefully defined, non-interactive services that most resem-
bled traditional terrestrial radio reflects Congress’ belief that, among all of
the transmission services that were available to the public at the time, inter-
active services were most likely to substitute for sales of CDs and records
and therefore posed the greatest risk to the recording industry. See S. REP.
NO. 104-128, at 16 (1995).
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bility requirements.114  It is a narrowly-crafted (though far from concise)
provision that reflects the congressional intent to address the potential im-
pact of new digital music services on the recording industry.  The provision
also reflects Congress’ intent to avoid stifling technology, imposing unnec-
essary burdens on certain existing distribution services, or adversely affect-
ing existing compensation mechanisms for the public performance of
musical works.115
Sections 114(e) through (j) address at length a variety of considera-
tions and procedures relating to the implementation of this new statutory
license, including:
• the authority for direct negotiations of licenses;116
• a limited antitrust exemption for collective negotiations of rates
and terms under the statutory license;117
114 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012).  Those eligibility requirements include that the
transmission not be part of an “interactive service,” id. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i); if
technically feasible, the transmission must include “metadata” providing in-
formation such as the title and artist of the sound recording, id.
§ 114(d)(2)(A)(iii); the transmission must not exceed the “sound recording
performance complement” defined in § 114(j)(13), §114(d)(2)(B)(i) &
(C)(i); the transmitting entity must not pre-announce the titles of the works
performed, id. § 114(d)(2)(B)(ii) & (C)(ii); “archived” programs available
on-demand to the listener must be five or more hours in length and availa-
ble for no more than two weeks, id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(iii); “continuous pro-
grams” must be three or more hours in length, id.; the transmitting entity
must not perform sound recordings as part of an audio-visual work that is
likely to cause confusion as to the association of the copyright owner, id.
§ 114(d)(2)(C)(iv); the transmitting entity must take reasonable measures
to prevent “scanning” and “stream-ripping” by users, id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(v)
& (vi); the sound recordings used must be “commercially released” by the
copyright owner, id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(vii); the transmitting entity must not in-
terfere with measures by the owners to identify and protect the copyrighted
work, id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(viii); and the transmitting entity must textually dis-
play to the listener the song title, album title (if any), and the featured artist
on the recording, id. § 114(d)(2)(C)(ix).
115 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995).
116 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (2012).  Although this provision allows direct negotiation
between copyright owners and non-interactive streaming services, it does
not require licensees to engage in direct negotiations if they prefer to take
advantage of the statutory license.  This means that a licensee (i.e., a digital
streaming service) is able to operate its business without engaging in direct
licensing as long as it qualifies for and complies with the requirements of
the statutory license, providing for a more efficient licensing system that
poses less potential for interference with the growth of the medium. See S.
REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995).
117 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (2012).  The antitrust exemption is a clear indication of how
much importance Congress placed on enabling an efficient and successful
statutory licensing system.  Joint discussions through collective agents are
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• detailed procedures for setting rates and terms for digital audio ser-
vices eligible for statutory licensing;118
• specific instructions for how licensing proceeds are to be divided
among both copyright owners and performers on sound
recordings;119
• placing limitations on licensing to affiliated entities;120 and
• ensuring that compensation for digital public performances of
sound recordings would not adversely affect compensation for pub-
lic performances of musical compositions.121
Overlaying the requirements for qualifying for the statutory license
are a host of specific procedures and the creation of an administrative ap-
paratus established in § 114(f) for determining rates for different types of
licensees under the statutory license.  The statute lays out standards to be
applied when setting statutory rates and a rate-setting process that is gov-
erned by Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”), an administrative decision-
making tribunal under the purview of the Library of Congress.122  Entities
wishing to participate in rate-setting proceedings must file a petition to do
so, but once the CRJs have set rates and terms, these rates and terms
become binding on all copyright owners and services in the particular class
of licensees that use the statutory license and typically cover a five-year
period for each class of service.123
Although different standards are identified for different types of
licensees, some of the factors that the CRJs are required to consider in
setting digital streaming royalties for preexisting services (such as Sirius
XM) under the statutory license are maximizing the availability of works
to the public, affording a fair return to copyright owners and a fair income
to copyright users, and minimizing any disruptive impact on the relevant
industries.124 For new subscription services and eligible nonsubscription
services (such as Pandora), the CRJs are required to establish “rates and
terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been
negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller,” considering “whether use of the service may substitute for or may
promote the sales of phonorecords” and “the relative roles of the copy-
often the only practical way to negotiate rates that will apply across similar
categories of licensees and to implement effective statutory licenses.
118 Id. § 114(f).
119 Id. § 114(g).
120 Id. § 114(h).
121 Id. § 114(i).
122 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341.
123 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(A), (B), § 114(f)(2)(A) & (B) (2012).
124 See, e.g., id. § 801(b)(1).
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right owner and the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the
service made available to the public with respect to relative creative con-
tribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.”125
In addition, the CRJs have authority to establish notice requirements for
exercising the statutory license and requirements for maintaining and de-
livering records — playlists or use logs — that reflect actual use of sound
recordings by services taking advantage of the license.126
B. The Sound of Silence:127 Legislative History of § 114
Nowhere in the § 114 statutory license provisions, or even in the grant
of a limited digital public performance right in sound recordings in
§ 106(6), is there a reference to pre-1972 recordings. There is no evidence
whatsoever in the legislative history of the 1995 DPRA that Congress in-
tended to leave the states free to enact or recognize protections for digital
performance rights in sound recordings that would interfere with the com-
pulsory statutory license created for the first time in the 1995 DPRA.  In-
stead, a close reading of the legislative history of the 1995 DPRA leads to
a conclusion that the omission of express discussion of pre-1972 recordings
was the result of Congress’ belief (and that of the entire music industry)
that no state law performance right in sound recordings existed.
The long history of arguments, studies, and reports about the per-
formance right in sound recordings that preceded the 1995 DPRA reflects
an assumption by Congress, the Copyright Office, and all interested par-
ties from the music industry that the 1995 DPRA created a new, narrowly-
defined performance right that had not existed for sound recordings under
either federal or state law.128  The provisions of § 114 and supporting anal-
ysis in the Senate and House reports were focused on establishing a
streamlined compulsory license system that would both benefit performers
and simplify the licensing process for digital streaming services; Congress
simply did not consider the possibility that pre-1972 recordings might re-
ceive state law protection that would require individual licensing indepen-
dent of the federal statutory license.
125 Id. § 114(f)(2)(B).  A detailed discussion of the rate-setting process and stan-
dards that apply for different types of licensees is outside the scope of this
article.  For an illustration of how detailed and complex these rate-setting
proceedings can be, see In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Record-
ings and Ephemeral Recordings, Copyright Royalty Board, No. 2009-1
CRB, Webcasting III, Final Determination of Rates and Terms (Jan. 5, 2011,
effective Mar. 9, 2011). See generally Andrew Stockment, Internet Radio:
The Case for a Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129
(2009); COPYRIGHT IN THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 5, at 143-44.
126 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(4) (2012).
127 Composed by Paul Simon; recorded by Simon & Garfunkel in 1964.
128 See supra Sections I(A) and (B).
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After the bills that led to the 1995 DPRA were first introduced in
1993, the parties affected by the legislation were encouraged to, and did,
hold many negotiations and roundtable discussions between representa-
tives of songwriters, performers, unions, performing rights societies, music
publishers, broadcast radio, and record companies.129  Both the Senate
Report and House Report repeatedly noted the careful balance that the
1995 DPRA was striking between multiple competing interests.130  It
sought to create a narrowly-defined revenue stream for owners of (and
performers in) sound recordings whose livelihood was threatened by the
advent of online access to and uncompensated downloads of musical re-
cordings.131 Congress also sought to protect entities that were engaged in
developing what has become one of the preferred sources of music listen-
ing for today’s consumers — streaming services offering music to consum-
ers in a manner similar to that of terrestrial radio. The statutory license
was thus a necessary corollary to the new digital public performance right;
it was necessary to streamline the licensing process for digital perform-
ances that were “radio-like” and thus were less likely to substitute for sales
of recordings.  The Senate Report stated,
[T]he Committee has sought to address the concerns of record producers
and performers regarding the effects that new digital technology and dis-
tribution systems might have on their core business without upsetting the
longstanding business and contractual relationships among record pro-
ducers and performers, music composers and publishers and broadcasters
that have served all of these industries well for decades. Accordingly, the
Committee has chosen to create a carefully crafted and narrow perform-
ance right, applicable only to certain digital transmissions of sound
recordings.132
129 See, e.g., Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (H.R.
1506): Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts &
Intellectual Property, 104th Cong. (June 28, 1995) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
regstat062895.html (last visited July 24, 2015).
130 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995).
131 Note that at the time that the 1995 DPRA was negotiated and ultimately en-
acted, third party online distribution sites for licensed downloads of sound
recordings were still almost a decade away from being successfully
launched. See, e.g., Pui-Wing Tam & Anna Wilde Matthews, Apple Polishes
Its Music Service, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003, at B1 (discussing announce-
ment of Apple’s planned online distribution site and noting that preexisting
record industry sites like PressPlay and MusicNet had been criticized as
“too cumbersome” and too limited in both breadth of songs offered and
permitted uses of purchased songs).
132 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13 (1995), quoted in and emphasis added by Bonneville
Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 497 (3d Cir. 2003); see also H.R. REP.
105-796 (Conf. Rep.) at 79-80 (stating that amendments to §§ 112 and 114
of the Copyright Act in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act were “in-
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The intent of Congress to reconcile competing interests in light of changed
circumstances in the music industry is a repeated theme in the legislative
history:
The limited right created by this legislation reflects changed circum-
stances:  the commercial exploitation of new technologies in ways that
may change the way prerecorded music is distributed to the consuming
public.  It is the Committee’s intent to provide copyright holders of sound
recordings with the ability to control the distribution of their product by
digital transmissions, without hampering the arrival of new technologies,
and without imposing new and unreasonable burdens on radio and televi-
sion broadcasters, which often promote, and appear to pose no threat to,
the distribution of sound recordings.133
The Senate Report discussed “the need to strike a balance among all of
the interests affected” by the new performance right, with that balance
“reflected in various limitations on the new performance right” set forth in
the 1995 DPRA.134  It further expressed the need for the legislation to
address concerns about the performance right making it “economically in-
feasible for some transmitters to continue certain current uses of sound
recordings.”135  This balancing process presumed that federal law was the
only relevant legal consideration; there is no evidence that Congress fac-
tored in the possibility of additional costs on transmitters that might be
imposed by owners of pre-1972 sound recordings under state law.  Instead,
the effects of creating a federal public performance right were measured
from a blank slate — i.e., from a starting point in which no compensation
was required of those who publicly performed sound recordings, because
no public performance right in sound recordings had previously been
given legal protection in either state or federal law and the broadcast and
music industries had developed based upon that foundation.
Both the House and the Senate Report reflect the belief of Congress
that a performance right in sound recordings was necessary to protect re-
cording artists and record companies, but that the right needed to be lim-
ited to allow the public to benefit from new digital transmission
technologies and to “strike a balance among all of the interests” affected
by the new right.136  Because of the anticipated continued advancement of
tended to achieve two purposes:  first, to further a stated objective of Con-
gress when it passed the [DPRA] to ensure that recording artists and record
companies will be protected as new technologies affect the ways in which
their creative works are used; and second, to create fair and efficient licens-
ing mechanisms that address the complex issues facing copyright owners and
copyright users as a result of the rapid growth of digital audio services”).
133 S. REP. NO. 104-108, at 15 (1995).
134 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995).
135 Id. at 16.
136 Id. at 14; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995).
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digital transmission technology, both reports stated the intent that “both
the rights and exemptions and limitations created by the bill be inter-
preted in order to achieve their intended purposes.”137
Throughout the legislative history of the 1971 SRA, the 1976 Copy-
right Act revision, and the 1995 DPRA, the baseline presumption was that
except for those uses that fell within the digital performance right under
federal law, other performances of sound recordings remained in the pub-
lic domain and were freely permitted without any payment obligation to
the owner.138  Reports of the Copyright Office associated with those legis-
lative enactments demonstrate a similar understanding that, for example,
broadcast radio stations could freely perform sound recordings as part of
their business operations without any payment obligation.139  Based on
the compulsory statutory licensing system established by Congress in 1995,
satellite and digital radio services grew and flourished, with business mod-
els relying on the absence of the need for individual licensing negotiations
with sound recording owners.  As will be discussed in the next section,
recent cases recognizing state law performance rights in sound recordings
have upset the carefully calibrated federal licensing system and interfere
with one of its primary purposes:  to simplify and streamline the licensing
process for nation-wide streaming services.
137 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 14 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995).
138 See supra Sections I(A) and I(B).  Copyright law exists not just to give legal
protection to copyright owners, but also to benefit the public by providing
access to creative works. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524
(1994) (“[T]the policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex,
more measured, than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for
copyright infringement,” and the monopoly privileges of copyright “are lim-
ited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good”); see also Julie L.
Ross, A Generation of Racketeers?  Eliminating Civil RICO Liability for
Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 55, 111-17 (2010)
(“This delicate balance between encouraging artistic creativity through a
limited monopoly and promoting wide-spread public access to creative
works is unique to copyright and distinguishes it from other contexts. . . .”);
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799,
1801 (2000) (describing the two “distinct but related” ways in which copy-
right law promotes progress in the arts:  “it seeks to increase both the quan-
tity and quality of creative output” and “it seeks to broaden public access to
creative works”).
139 See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS
OF DIGITAL AUDIO TRANSMISSION SERVICES 142-57 (Oct. 1991) (summa-
rizing the arguments of interested parties and the Copyright Office’s views
on granting performance rights to owners of sound recordings, with re-
peated references to broadcast radio and other entities that perform sound
recordings as doing so for “free”).
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III. SURRENDER:140  THE GOLDSTEIN CASE AND
SUPREMACY CLAUSE PREEMPTION CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER STATE LAW
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN PRE-1972
SOUND RECORDINGS
Preemption analysis of state laws that overlap with federal copyright
law and policy is first analyzed under the express preemption provisions of
§ 301 of the Copyright Act.141  However, the fact that § 301’s express pre-
emption clause does not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings does not end
the inquiry about whether a particular state law that purports to grant
copyright-like rights to owners of pre-1972 sound recordings is preempted
by federal law.  The broad language in the § 301(c) saving clause — “any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not
be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067”142 — might at
first glance seem to end the inquiry.  However, in addition to any express
preemption or saving clause that Congress might incorporate into a statu-
tory framework, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution143 re-
quires that state law give way to federal law under specific circumstances,
including when state laws conflict with federal law.144
This “conflict preemption” arises under the Supremacy Clause when a
“challenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”145  Analyzing
whether a conflict exists between state and federal law requires considera-
140 Composed by Doc Pomus and Mort Shuman, recorded by Elvis Presley in 1960
and released in 1961, going on to become one of the best-selling singles in
history.
141 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
142 Id. § 301(c).
143 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
144 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 ((1984); Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).  The other circumstances in which
Supremacy Clause preemption applies are those in which Congress has ex-
pressed a clear intent to pre-empt state law; those in which, despite the
absence of express preemptive language, Congress has demonstrated an in-
tent to displace state law by creating so pervasive a framework of regulation
that it leaves no room for state action; or those in which compliance with
both federal and state law is impossible. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at
699. See generally Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption
and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW,
AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 13, 21-22 (William W.
Buzbee ed., 2009).  None of those alternative Supremacy Clause preemp-
tion circumstances is argued to apply here.
145 Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 699 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\62-4\CPY402.txt unknown Seq: 37 29-OCT-15 15:26
State Law Digital Public Performance Rights 581
tion of the purposes underlying both laws and analysis of how the specific
state law at issue interacts with the specific federal law at issue.146  The
Court’s analysis in upholding a state law penalizing reproduction of sound
recordings in Goldstein v. California147 is a helpful predicate for consider-
ing conflict preemption of state laws relating to sound recordings.  How-
ever its reasoning leads to a different result when applied to the current
debate over state law performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings and
how they interact with current federal law instituting a compulsory licens-
ing regime for digital Internet and satellite radio services.
A. Happy Together:148 Goldstein’s Supremacy Clause Analysis
The U.S. Supreme Court has only once addressed conflict preemption
under the Supremacy Clause in the context of a state law governing sound
recordings that was argued to conflict with federal copyright law.  In Gold-
stein, the petitioners were charged under a California statute making it a
criminal offense to “pirate” — or physically copy — phonorecords pro-
duced by others.149  They moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the statute was in conflict with Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution and the federal statutes enacted thereunder.150
In addressing the Petitioners’ preemption arguments, the Court first
rejected the argument that all power over copyright had been ceded to the
federal government by the states:
146 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1979); Arizona,
132 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
147 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
148 Composed by Gary Bonner and Alan Gordon, recorded by The Turtles in
1967.
149 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).  In addressing the Petition-
ers’ arguments, the Court noted that Copyright Act had been amended by
Congress while the case was pending in the state courts to allow federal
copyright protection for sound recordings, but that section 3 of the amend-
ment specifically provided that “such protection is to be available only to
sound recordings ‘fixed, published, and copyrighted’ on and after February
15, 1972, and before January 1, 1975, and that nothing in Title 17, as
amended is to ‘be applied retroactively or [to] be construed as affecting in
any way any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before’ February
15, 1972.” Id. at 552. Because all of the recordings at issue in Goldstein
were fixed before February 15, 1972, the Court noted that the 1971 amend-
ments had no application in the appeal before it. Id.  However, the opinion
predates the 1976 Copyright Act’s preemption and saving clauses, as well as
the 1995 DPRA, and it addressed a criminal statute relating to physical cop-
ying of records — a different right in the “bundle” of exclusive rights that,
unlike the public performance right, has always applied to all copyrighted
works under both federal and state law.
150 Id. at 548-50.
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Although the Copyright Clause thus recognizes the potential benefits of a
national system, it does not indicate that all writings are of national inter-
est or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded. . . .
Since the subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may
thus be of purely local importance and not worthy of national attention
or protection, we cannot discern such an unyielding national interest as to
require an inference that state power to grant copyrights has been relin-
quished to exclusive federal control.151
Noting that its conclusion that the states had not surrendered their power
to issue copyrights did “not end the inquiry,”152 the Court went on to eval-
uate whether the California statute was void under the Supremacy
Clause.153 It acknowledged that “the conflicts which may develop between
state and federal action are as varied as the fields to which congressional
action may apply,”154 and the Court thus described its task as determining
“‘whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.’”155
Absent evidence of a specific intent on the part of Congress to pre-
empt state action and the particular area, the Court stated that preemption
under the Supremacy Clause may still be found if “Congress so occupied
the field of copyright protection as to pre-empt all comparable state ac-
tion.”156  The petitioners in Goldstein relied heavily on the Court’s opin-
ions in Sears157 and Compco,158 which had previously found state laws
granting patent-like protection to designs to be preempted because Con-
gress had intended to occupy the field of patent protection.  In both Sears
and Compco, the Court emphasized that by excluding certain matters
from federal patent protection, Congress intended that those matters be
freely accessible to the public.159  State laws that limited that free public
access were thus found to be preempted.  Just as the Court had found to
be the case in when Congress chose to exclude certain works from federal
patent protection, the petitioners argued that when Congress chose to ex-
empt sound recordings from federal copyright protection in the 1909 Cop-
yright Act, it intended such works to be freely available to the public for
151 Id. at 558.
152 Id. at 561.
153 The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
154 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
155 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
156 Id. at 567.
157 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
158 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
159 Sears, 376 U.S. at 230; see Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569-70.
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copying and that state statutes protecting such works would interfere with
the balance struck by Congress between protection of authors and public
access to works of authorship.160  However, the Court distinguished Sears
and Compco, noting that the patent laws at issue in those cases reflected a
careful balancing by Congress of “the need to encourage innovation and
originality of invention against the need to ensure competition in the sale
of identical or substantially identical products.”161
In contrast, the Court found no analogous conflict between state and
federal law with respect to sound recordings, stating, “In regard to this
category of ‘Writings,’ Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left
the area unattended, and no reason exists why the State should not be free
to act.”162 Reaffirming its decisions in Sears and Compco, the Court found
that they had no application to the dispute over the legitimacy of Califor-
nia’s statute prohibiting the copying of sound recordings “since Congress
has indicated neither that it wishes to protect, nor to free from protection,
recordings of musical performances fixed prior to February 15, 1972.”163
Goldstein, however, should not be considered to be the last word on
whether conflict preemption principles apply to other state laws providing
protections to sound recordings that differ both in nature and in their in-
teraction with federal copyright law enacted in the years since Goldstein
was decided.  Preemption under the Supremacy Clause is a question of
how a particular state law interacts with federal law.164  Distinct — and
difficult — issues are presented regarding the intent of Congress in the
series of legislative enactments since Goldstein and how those enactments
affect the preemption analysis in the context of a new form of copyright —
digital audio transmissions — that did not exist when Goldstein was
decided.
B. Let Me Go the Right Way:165  Applying Supremacy Clause
Preemption Analysis to State Laws Governing Digital Public
Performances of Sound Recordings
As Goldstein made clear, consideration of Supremacy Clause preemp-
tion requires two separate inquiries, and both are independent of any ex-
press preemption clause or saving clause in a federal statute.166
160 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551.
161 Id. at 569.
162 Id. at 570.
163 Id. at 571.
164 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503-04 (2012).
165 Composed by Berry Gordy, recorded by the Supremes in 1962.
166 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861
(2000); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503-04. See generally Sandra Zeller,
Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659 (2008-09) (discussing Su-
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First, the court must consider whether the states have any power at all
to regulate the particular area of law — i.e., whether such power was dedi-
cated solely to the federal government under the Constitution or whether
the states reserved the power to govern in the area.167  In the context of
intellectual property, that question has been definitively answered:  “the
Patent and Copyright Clauses, do not by their own force or by negative
implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the promo-
tion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions.”168  States re-
main free to “promote originality and creativity in their own domains”169
so long as they do so in a manner that is “not inconsistent with federal
law.”170  Thus, protection of copyright is not solely within the power of the
federal government, but state power to govern in the area of copyright is
limited.
The second step in any Supremacy Clause analysis, if it is determined
that states do have the power to act in the area, is to determine whether
there is any conflict between the particular state law and federal law in
question.171  “Conflict preemption” arises under the Supremacy Clause ei-
ther when compliance with both state and federal law is physically impos-
sible or when a “challenged state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.’”172  Where federal intellectual property law has struck a careful
balance between the need to promote creativity and the efficient opera-
tion of the federal system of protection designed by Congress, “state regu-
lation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with
preme Court treatment of saving clauses and preemption in the context of
federal regulation of the environment, labor and employment law, products
liability, and agricultural practices).
167 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 552-61; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 165-66 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
478-79 (1979).
168 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165 (citing Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 552-61).
169 Id.
170 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 156.
171 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62; Kewanee Oil Corp., 416 U.S. at 479.
172 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). See generally Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent,
and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 198-201 (2004-05) (explain-
ing that “obstacle” conflict preemption evaluates congressional purposes
for the legislation or regulation at issue rather than congressional intent to
preempt and generally arguing that the Supreme Court has implicitly
adopted an approach to Supremacy Clause preemption that mirrors govern-
ment interest analysis in choice of law determinations).
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the balance struck by Congress. . . .”173  In Goldstein, the Court found that
no such obstacle existed because the California law in question — one
criminalizing unauthorized reproduction of records — provided protection
that was not in conflict with federal copyright law or policy, as Congress at
the time had expressed no interest in either protecting pre-1972 sound re-
cordings or freeing them from protection.174  However, the Court’s rea-
soning in Goldstein cannot be mechanically applied to all state laws that
arguably apply to pre-1972 sound recordings.  The specific state law in
question must be evaluated in light of current federal law and policy, ex-
amining the objectives of both areas of law to determine whether the state
law clashes with federal law and whether a saving clause precludes pre-
emption in spite of the particular conflict that might be found.175
173 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152 (recognizing careful balance in federal patent
laws between need to promote innovation and the ability to exploit inven-
tive resources and applying conflict preemption to invalidate Florida statute
prohibiting use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat
hulls because the statute conflicted with a strong federal policy favoring free
competition in ideas not qualifying for patent protection).
174 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569, 571.
175 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503-04 (2012); see also Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1979); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).  Professor Pulsinelli has also engaged in
a conflict preemption analysis regarding state and federal laws governing
public performances of sound recordings, in an article published just as this
one was submitted for publication.  Gary Pulsinelli, Happy Together?  The
Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and State Protection for Sound Recordings,
82 TENN. L. REV. 167 (2014).  Professor Pulsinelli agrees that state law rec-
ognition of a public performance right in sound recordings presents a con-
flict preemption problem, focusing primarily on the interests in uniformity
underlying federal copyright law and the lack of a local, state interest in
nation-wide digital transmissions that might outweigh the federal interest in
uniformity. Id. at 208-17. This article views conflict preemption through a
narrower lens, focusing on specific conflicts created by applying state law to
transmissions covered by the federal compulsory licensing system rather
than all forms of digital transmissions.  Because Congress was willing to tol-
erate some lack of uniformity in law regarding sound recordings when it
opted to exclude pre-1972 sound recordings from federal protection and to
preserve state law protections for those recordings, the general federal in-
terest in uniformity of copyright law by itself may not provide sufficient
basis for preempting state laws — at least not without considering the lan-
guage and purposes of a particular federal statutory provision.  The neces-
sity of uniformity in a particular area of law is certainly an important policy
consideration in preemption analysis. See, e.g., Verchick & Mendelson,
supra note 144, at 32 (explaining that the “basic values at stake in the pre- R
emption debate” are “a concern for local democracy and state experimenta-
tion, on one side, and a desire for national uniformity and efficiency on the
other”).  Professor Pulsinelli  persuasively distinguishes Goldstein based on
changes in the music industry wrought by technological development over
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1. I Walk the Line:176  Analyzing the Objectives of the State and
Federal Laws at Issue
The application of conflict preemption principles in this situation —
where Congress has stepped in with a comprehensive federal program af-
ter courts had previously ruled that state laws were not preempted — is
implicated by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Arizona v. United States.177
There, the Court considered whether four separate provisions of an Ari-
zona statute aimed at addressing the problem of illegal immigration were
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.178  Noting the “extensive and
complex” federal governance of immigration and alien status,179 the Court
deemed it necessary to review each of the four provisions to determine
how the particular provision — not the law as a whole — interacted with
federal immigration laws to evaluate whether preemption applied to the
specific provision.180
Of particular relevance here is the Court’s discussion of section 5(C)
of the Arizona law, which made it a misdemeanor for unauthorized aliens
to “apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an
employee or independent contractor” in Arizona.181 Before there had
been any “comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of
unauthorized aliens,”182 the Court had upheld a California statute regulat-
ing employment of aliens against a preemption challenge, finding that
“States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State.”183  How-
ever, at the time, “the Federal Government had expressed no more than ‘a
peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.’”184 In Ari-
zona, the Court found that because federal law had changed and a com-
prehensive framework relating to employment of illegal aliens had been
the decades since the 1976 Act and the resulting changed balance between
federal and state interests in protecting copyright that weakens the “local
democracy” and “state experimentation” side of the equation in preemp-
tion analysis of sound recording rights.  However, this article focuses more
specifically on the objectives of the federal compulsory license system for
digital audio transmissions reflected in the structure of section 114 and its
legislative history than on the overarching interest in national uniformity
within the federal Copyright Act.
176 Composed by Johnny Cash and recorded by Johnny Cash in 1956.
177 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
178 Id. at 2497.
179 Id. at 2499.
180 Id. at 2501-02.
181 Id. at 2503.
182 Id.
183 Id. (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)).
184 Id. (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360).
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put into place, with a deliberate choice by Congress to not impose criminal
penalties on aliens who seek to work in the U.S., the Arizona law “would
interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress.”185
As Goldstein recognized and as § 301(c) confirms, the states possess
broad authority to protect pre-1972 sound recordings.  However, just as
the states’ interest in regulating employment in Arizona did not outweigh
a subsequently-enacted federal regime when specific state laws interfered
with its ability to accomplish its objectives, neither should states’ continu-
ing interests in and power to protect pre-1972 recordings be permitted to
interfere with the goals and objectives of the national compulsory licensing
regime enacted by Congress for digital performances of sound
recordings.186
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to evaluate a conflict be-
tween the objectives of state and federal law similar to the one at issue
here in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp.187  In Capital Cities Cable, Inc.,
the federal regulation of cable television by the F.C.C. and comprehensive
compulsory copyright licensing system for retransmissions of copyrighted
broadcasts over cable television were found to preempt an Oklahoma stat-
ute that prohibited broadcasts of advertisements for alcoholic bever-
ages.188  In analyzing the conflict between the Oklahoma statute and the
185 Id. at 2504-05.  The Court also found that the existence of an express preemp-
tion provision in the relevant federal statute had no affect on the
Supremacy Clause preemption analysis, in spite of the fact that the preemp-
tion provision barred states from penalizing employers of unauthorized
aliens but was silent about whether states could penalize the employees
themselves. Id.
186 The fact that states are given broad authority over pre-1972 sound recordings
is not inconsistent with this result.  In preempting a Virginia law that pur-
ported to allow a surviving spouse to receive federal life insurance benefits
from an insured who had listed an ex-spouse as the designated beneficiary,
the Supreme Court noted that even though “regulation of domestic rela-
tions is traditionally in the domain of state law” and thus that there is a
“‘presumption against pre-emption’ of state laws governing domestic rela-
tions,” state domestic relations laws must still give way when they present a
clear conflict with federal law.  Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950
(2013). Similarly, the 1995 DPRA does not supplant all state law protec-
tions for pre-1972 sound recordings — only those that are in conflict with
the limits it placed on digital public performance rights in order to establish
a national statutory license regime.
187 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
188 Id. at 716.  In addressing the conflict between F.C.C. regulations requiring that
cable systems carry certain broadcast programming without changing it and
the state statute’s requirement that cable services in Oklahoma remove al-
coholic beverage advertisements from that programming, the Court dis-
cussed the history of F.C.C. regulation of cable systems, noting that the
F.C.C. expressly adopted “a program of ‘deliberately structured dualism’ in
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purposes and goals of the provisions of the Copyright Act relating to the
statutory license for cable television retransmissions of copyrighted works,
the Court stated:
Congress has considered the impact of this new technology, and has,
through the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq., acted to facilitate the cable industry’s ability to distribute
broadcast programming on a national basis. . . .  In revising the Copyright
Act, however, Congress concluded that cable operators should be re-
quired to pay royalties to owners of copyrighted programs retransmitted
by their systems on pain of liability for copyright infringement.  At the
same time, Congress recognized that “it would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate [appropriate roy-
alty payments] with every copyright owner” in order to secure consent for
such retransmissions. Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p.
89 (1976).  Section 111 of the 1976 Act codifies the solution devised by
Congress.  It establishes a program of compulsory copyright licensing that
permits cable systems to retransmit distant broadcast signals without se-
curing permission from the copyright owner and, in turn, requires each
system to pay royalty fees to a central royalty fund based on a percentage
of its gross revenues.189
The Court also noted that the compulsory licensing system devised by
Congress included specific requirements for cable systems to take advan-
tage of the protections afforded by the statutory license190 and Congress’
recognition of the “virtually insurmountable and logistical problems” that
cable operators would face if they were required to edit or block programs
which state and local authorities were given responsibility for granting
franchises to cable operators within their communities and for overseeing
such local incidents of cable operations as delineating franchise areas, regu-
lating the construction of cable facilities, and maintaining rights of way.”
Id. at 702 (quoting Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207
(1972), aff’d sub nom., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm., 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975)).  In a series of rulings, later upheld
by the courts, the F.C.C. delineated the scope of federal regulation of cable
services, specifically precluding states from regulating rates or signal car-
riage for cable systems. Id. at 702-03.  The federal interests justifying such
exclusive federal control over aspects of cable systems were the need to
“assure the orderly development of this new technology into the national
communications structure,” id. at 703 n.8 (quoting Duplicative and Exces-
sive Over-Regulation-CATV, 54 F.C.C.2d 855, 863 (1975)), and providing
increased viewing options and a diversity of services to the public. Id. at
704 (citing CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663,
746 (1980).  Similar federal interests govern the establishment of a federal
licensing system for Internet and satellite radio, both of which are inher-
ently national in scope and, at the time that the 1995 DPRA was enacted,
were emerging technologies that Congress did not want to suppress when it
granted a limited public performance right.
189 Id. at 709-10 (footnote omitted).
190 Id. at 710.
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as to which they were unable to obtain direct copyright permissions from
the owners.191  The Court stated:
In devising this system, Congress has clearly sought to further the impor-
tant public purposes framed in the Copyright Clause, U.S. Const., Art. 1,
§ 8, of rewarding the creators of copyrighted works and of “promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”  Com-
pulsory licensing not only protects the commercial value of copyrighted
works but also enhances the ability of cable systems to retransmit such
programs carried on television broadcast signals.  By requiring cable op-
erators to delete commercial advertisements for wine, however, the
Oklahoma ban forces these operators to lose the protections of compul-
sory licensing.  Of course, it is possible for cable systems to comply with
the Oklahoma ban by simply abandoning their importation of the distant
broadcast signals covered by the Copyright Act. But such a loss of view-
ing options would plainly thwart the policy identified by both Congress
and the FCC of facilitating and encouraging the importation of distant
broadcast signals.192
Similar concerns led to the compulsory licensing system for digital radio
services:  obtaining the rights to broadcast a full range of sound recordings
to support an online or satellite radio service would have created an insur-
mountable obstacle for fledgling digital radio services, particularly in light
of the fact that they were competing with terrestrial radio, which the 1995
DPRA expressly exempted from any licensing or royalty obligation.193  If
states were permitted to require separate licenses for use of pre-1972
191 Id. n.13.
192 Id. at 710-11 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) and citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 428-29 (1984)).
193 Although Congress did not want to place the burden of negotiating individual
licenses on non-interactive digital transmission services that provided radio-
like services, interactive services that did not qualify for the statutory li-
cense were expected to go through that process.  For example, Spotify, a
primarily on-demand Swedish streaming service that is gaining in popularity
in the United States, delayed its launch into the United States market for
almost two years while it negotiated licenses with all of the major labels.
See, e.g., Ben Sisario, New Service Offers Service in Quantity, Not by Song,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
07/14/technology/spotify-music-streaming-service-comes-to-us.html?_r=0.
In 2014, recording artist Taylor Swift made headlines when she refused to
license her new album to Spotify and pulled all but one of her existing songs
from the service, contending that Spotify was not offering high enough li-
cense fees in the per-stream rate it offered. See Jack Linshi, Here’s Why
Taylor Swift Pulled Her Music from Spotify, TIME (Nov. 3, 2014), http://time
.com/3554468/why-taylor-swift-spotify.  Interactive streaming services like
Spotify that do not qualify for the section 114 statutory license are thus at
the mercy of individual recording owners who are free to withhold their
music, whereas the compulsory license created by Congress for non-interac-
tive streaming services was designed to make all recordings available to
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works on Internet and satellite radio services, these services would likely
end up limiting the availability of pre-1972 sound recordings on their sta-
tions, a result that benefits neither the public nor owners of pre-1972
recordings.
Although Capital Cities Cable, Inc. involved a situation where the
F.C.C. had precisely delineated the scope of permitted state regulation of
cable services and the Oklahoma statute went beyond those limits,194
there the state had perhaps a stronger argument for its authority than that
presented by the saving clause in § 301(c).  Oklahoma relied on the
Twenty-First Amendment in asserting that the Constitution had relegated
regulation of alcoholic beverages to the states, but the Court, weighing the
strength of the interests underlying the Twenty-First Amendment and
those underlying the compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright
Act, concluded that the federal interest in the uniform application of the
compulsory license and F.C.C. regulations governing carriage of cable sig-
nals trumped the state’s interest in regulating alcohol.195  The regulation
of television advertisements for alcohol was only a small aspect of the
state’s ability to regulate alcohol in its territory that had not previously
been applied to cable services, and thus the impact of preemption was
minimal on the state’s overall regulation of alcohol.196 Similarly, in the
context of the digital public performance right in sound recordings, the
states have not previously recognized or protected such a right, and fed-
eral preemption of that right would have no impact on the state’s ability to
protect other uses of pre-1972 sound recordings that implicate different
rights in the bundle of protections offered to copyright owners of sound
recordings.
2. Saved:197 The § 301(c) Saving Clause Does Not Preclude
Supremacy Clause Preemption
The presence of an express statutory preemption provision and saving
clause for state laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings198 presents a
separate interpretive hurdle in the preemption analysis, but it does not
necessarily preclude the application of ordinary conflict preemption prin-
ciples.199 Yet, Sirius XM did not argue and neither federal court in the Flo
those non-interactive services without the need to negotiate individual
licenses.
194 Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 711.
195 Id. at 715-16.
196 Id.
197 Composed by Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller; recorded by Lavern Baker in
1961.
198 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
199 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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& Eddie cases addressed whether the Supremacy Clause preempted the
state law rights asserted by the plaintiff.200 The California district court’s
sole discussion of preemption was a brief mention of the express preemp-
tion provision the Copyright Act in concluding that, pursuant to § 301(c),
“the Federal Copyright Act does not apply to [pre-1972] recordings and
explicitly allows states to continue to regulate them.”201  However, this
conclusion should only have been the start of any consideration of
whether the state laws at issue would be preempted by federal copyright
law, not the end of it; it does not answer the question of whether the
Supremacy Clause precludes enforcement of state law in connection with
specific types of digital performances of sound recordings.202
The New York court in the Flo & Eddie litigation went a step further
than the California court, more closely analyzing § 301(c) and its interac-
tion with the Commerce Clause.203  The Southern District of New York
200 Instead, Sirius relied on the dormant Commerce Clause, asserting that apply-
ing state laws protecting public performance rights to its satellite broadcast-
ing activities would control commerce outside any individual state’s borders
and thus would run afoul of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Defendant’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 20-22, No. CV 13-5693 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2014);
Defendant Sirius XM’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability and
Supporting Memorandum of Law at 18-20, No. 1:13-CV-23182 (S.D. Fla.
July 15, 2014).  In both briefs, Sirius XM argued that allowing owners of
pre-1972 sound recordings to assert state law-based digital performance
rights would interfere with the elaborate compulsory licensing system estab-
lished by the DRPA in 1995, but presented that argument as a policy reason
for refusing to find a state law right rather than as a reason for Supremacy
Clause preemption.
201 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307, 1311 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(c)).  In a footnote, the court briefly ad-
dressed and rejected Sirius XM’s dormant Commerce Clause argument, as-
serting: “Because Congress specifically authorized protection of pre-1972
sound recording rights by the states in 17 U.S.C. § 301(c), the California
statute protecting those rights is not subject to the Commerce Clause.” Id.
at 1315 n.1.  Professor Gary Pulsinelli has argued that the dormant Com-
merce Clause preempts a proposed Tennessee statute giving state law pro-
tections to public performances of sound recordings, as well as the state
laws at issue in the Flo & Eddie litigation.  Pulsinelli, supra note 175, at 217- R
34.  This article takes no position on the dormant Commerce Clause argu-
ment, other than to assert that Supremacy Clause preemption is a stronger
basis on which to invalidate the state law claims at issue. See, e.g., Viet D.
Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2098 & Fig. 1
(2000) (discussing and illustrating the spectrum of doctrinal mechanisms
through which federal law displaces state law).
202 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571; Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2504-05 (2012).
203 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, 2014 WL
7172270, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
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Flo & Eddie opinion addressed the language of § 301(c) in the context of
whether it demonstrated an intent by Congress to preclude Commerce
Clause challenges to assertion of state law rights in pre-1972 recordings.204
However, its reasoning applies equally in the context of conflict preemp-
tion under the Supremacy Clause.  The court stated:
I note that § 301(c) is contained in the section of the federal copyright law
that addresses the law’s preemptive scope.  Thus, the language cited by
Flo and Eddie could plausibly be interpreted, not to allow states to im-
pose otherwise unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce, but
only to limit the scope of federal copyright law — by excluding, for a
period of time, otherwise preempted state laws from the preemptive
reach of 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).  Under this interpretation, although § 301(c)
broadly reaches “any” state right or remedy, it shields state regulation
only from statutory preemption, not from Commerce Clause scrutiny.205
Finding it reasonable to interpret § 301(c) “as a provision about federal
statutory preemption, and not as an authorization for states to interfere
with interstate commerce,” the court rejected Flo & Eddie’s assertion that
the use of the term “any” in § 301(c) demonstrated an intent by Congress
to permit “all” state laws regulating pre-1972 recordings.206  The Copy-
right Office has also agreed with the proposition that “section 301(c) does
not prohibit all subsequent [federal] regulation of pre-1972 recordings.”207
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at *22.  The court went on, however, to reject Sirius XM’s argument based
on the dormant Commerce Clause because it concluded that New York
common law on copyright “does not ‘regulate’ anything,” but is simply a
recognition of a property right. Id. at *22-23.
207 COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, supra note 6, at
131 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
641 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), but disagreeing with that opinion’s ultimate conclusion
that 17 U.S.C. § 512 “safe harbors” applied to pre-1972 sound recordings).
Moreover, the Copyright Office has suggested that even though § 301(c)
was never amended after the Uruguay Round Agreement Act was passed in
1994, bringing foreign pre-1972 sound recordings under federal copyright
protection, under the reasoning of Goldstein, an argument could be success-
fully made that Congress has no longer left the question of protection for
restored foreign recordings “unattended,” and thus conflicting state laws
are preempted. Id. at 19.  In the Ringer Report, supra note 30, at 19-20, the R
Copyright Office discussed Goldstein at length, describing it as “surprising”
in light of the Sears/Compco decisions but reasoning that the Court was
distinguishing between situations in which state law “may possibly” lead to
conflicts with federal laws and those in which conflicts will necessarily arise.
Focusing on sound recordings fixed between 1972 and 1978, as to which it
was unclear whether any state law performance rights could be applied, the
Copyright Office Report reasoned that state law performance rights in post-
1978 sound recordings would be clearly preempted, and that any state law
performance rights in pre-1972 recordings were expressly preserved, but
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Similar reasoning applies in the context of conflict preemption under
the Supremacy Clause. The language of § 301(c) is intended to, and clearly
does, exempt state laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings from statu-
tory preemption under § 301(a).  What it does not do is preclude any con-
sideration or analysis of whether a specific state law conflicts with the
goals and purposes of a specific aspect of federal copyright law under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  Even though
§ 301(c) serves as a “saving clause” with respect to statutory preemption of
state laws governing pre-1972 recordings, it is no different from saving
clauses in other federal statutes that have failed to limit the application of
ordinary conflict preemption principles under the Supremacy Clause.208
For example, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,209 the
Court found that a saving clause in the express preemption provision of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966210 did not pre-
clude consideration of ordinary conflict preemption principles.  The saving
clause at issue in Geier stated that “[c]ompliance with” a federal safety
standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law,”211 thus mirroring the “any rights or remedies” language of § 301(c).
The Court found that “the savings clause (like the express pre-emption
provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption prin-
ciples,”212 noting that “this Court has repeatedly ‘decline[d] to give broad
effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory
scheme established by federal law.’”213
Although § 301(c) must be interpreted to preserve some aspects of
state law protecting pre-1972 sound recordings, it cannot be that the lan-
guage of § 301(c) serves as a blanket grant of authority in perpetuity — or
that state law performance rights in 1972–78 sound recordings could be pre-
empted under the reasoning of Sears/Compco and Goldstein if  the particu-
lar state law were found to conflict with federal policy. Id. at 20.  This
reasoning is not inconsistent with the position taken in this article, as it was
premised upon the fact that, in 1978, Congress had elected to provide no
federal performance right in sound recordings, id., and thus there was no
basis for considering whether state law protection of performance rights in
pre-1972 sound recordings would necessarily conflict with federal copyright
law.  After 1995, with the comprehensive statutory licensing system that was
established for digital performance rights in sound recordings, such a con-
flict became real and requires a revisiting of any conclusions reached before
federal law had granted any protection or created a comprehensive compul-
sory licensing system for digital performance rights.
208 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
209 Id.
210 Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1391–1431).
211 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.)).
212 Id. at 869.
213 Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)).
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at least until 2067 — for states to pass any laws that they see fit or to
interpret their common law to grant new property rights with respect to
pre-1972 sound recordings, regardless of how those laws might conflict
with any subsequent federal copyright legislation.  Like the saving clause
in Geier, it expresses no congressional intent to foreclose the application
of ordinary conflict preemption principles, but merely limits the scope of
the statutory preemption provision.  As the Court reasoned in Geier:
Why, in any event, would Congress not have wanted ordinary pre-emp-
tion principles to apply where an actual conflict with a federal objective is
at stake?  Some such principle is needed.  In its absence, state law could
impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal regulatory
mandates. . . .  Insofar as petitioner’s argument would permit common-
law actions that “actually conflict” with federal regulations, it would take
from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve
the law’s congressionally-mandated objectives that the Constitution,
through the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to pro-
tect.  To the extent that such an interpretation of the saving provision
reads into a particular federal law toleration of a conflict that those prin-
ciples would otherwise forbid, it permits that law to defeat its own objec-
tives, or potentially, as the Court has put it before, to “destroy itself.”214
Similarly, § 301(c) simply limits the scope of the statutory preemption of
state law protections provided for in § 301(a); it does not hamper Con-
gress’ ability to subsequently limit state law protections, as it may do in the
ongoing copyright revision process,215 nor does it hamper the courts’ abil-
214 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871-72 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc.,
524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998)).  This purposive approach to the statutory inter-
pretation of saving clauses is particularly appropriate in situations in which
a broadly-interpreted saving clause in federal legislation poses an obstacle
to the goals of a separate piece of federal legislation. See, e.g., Donald G.
Gifford, William L. Reynolds & Andrew M. Murad, A Case Study in the
Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation:
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2012); Christopher H. Schroeder,
Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:  THE THE-
ORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 119, 120-21,
135 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (identifying the “crucial question” in
preemption analysis as “how to interpret the content of the federal law,”
which “depends on congressional intent,” and comparing preemption cases
in which the Supreme Court has relied extensively on legislative history and
findings to evaluate congressional intent).
215 See, e.g., Congressional Hearings on the Review of Copyright Law, COPYRIGHT
.GOV, http://copyright.gov/laws/hearings/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).  That
§ 301(c) does not limit the ability of subsequently-enacted federal copyright
provisions to affect state laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings is con-
sistent with the 2011 Copyright Office Report on Federal Copyright Protec-
tions for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, in which the Copyright Office
recommended that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought under the federal
copyright regime. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RE-
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ity to find conflict preemption under the Supremacy Clause if state laws
conflict with federal law as it evolves.216
The Supreme Court has also rejected a contention that the presence
of an express statutory preemption provision and saving clause “create[s]
some kind of ‘special burden’ beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emp-
tion principles.”217  However, even if the express recognition of states’
ability to protect pre-1972 sound recordings in § 301(c) does require a
higher burden in making a case for Supremacy Clause preemption,218 this
burden very likely would be met here.  This is not a situation like that
noted by the Court in Bonito Boats, where the case for federal preemption
is weakened because “Congress has indicated its awareness of the opera-
tion of state law in the field of federal interest, and has nonetheless de-
cided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is]
between them.’”219  Although Congress was clearly aware of state law
protections against unauthorized reproduction and distribution of sound
recordings at the time that both the Sound Recording Act of 1971 and the
Copyright Act of 1976 were enacted,220 the same cannot be said for the
CORDINGS, supra note 6, at 175-78. The Report was issued pursuant to the
request by Congress that the Copyright Office conduct such a study in the
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, H.R. 1105, Pub. L. No. 111–8.
216 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-74; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2503-04 (2012).
217 Geier, 529 U.S. at 870 (quoting Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, 529 U.S. at
898-99).  Some scholars have criticized the Court’s backing away from a
presumption against preemption where a saving clause exists, but that criti-
cism is largely focused on regulatory contexts in which state experimenta-
tion is encouraged and serves as a complement to the federal regulatory
regime. See, e.g., Zeller, supra note 166, at 1668, 1674-79 (criticizing recent R
Supreme Court cases as failing to apply a presumption against preemption
in saving clause cases and stating, “[w]here Congress includes a savings
clause, it recognizes the need either to fill a regulatory void left by federal
law or to enhance protection for affected communities through complemen-
tary federal and state authorities”).  Other scholars have argued that no
presumption against preemption exists, but instead that preemption deter-
minations are highly context-specific, requiring “careful application of dif-
ferent interpretive assumptions and substantive principles in specific
contexts to determine whether state laws are displaced — in many cases by
congressional enactments, but in others by judicial doctrines absent any af-
firmative action by Congress.”  Dinh, supra note 201 at 2087, 2092. R
218 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67
(1989).
219 Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp, 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
220 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 3-4 (1971) (discussing “widespread unauthorized
reproduction of phonograph records and tapes,” noting statutes enacted in
New York and California to suppress record piracy, but emphasizing the
limited relief available under state law in support of the need for federal
copyright protection of sound recordings); H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2-3
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existence of any state law protection for performance rights in sound
recordings.221
3. Let It Be Me:222  Preemption of State Digital Public
Performance Rights that Conflict with the Federal
Compulsory License
As discussed in Part II, supra, one of the main purposes of Congress
in establishing the compulsory statutory license for digital performances
by radio-like services was to create an efficient licensing mechanism for a
narrow class of qualifying digital streaming services.223  Allowing owners
of pre-1972 works to assert state law digital public performance rights di-
rectly conflicts with the purposes and objectives of this compulsory license,
because it requires digital streaming services that qualify for the federal
(1971) (noting that eight states had enacted statutes protecting against un-
authorized reproduction of sound recordings and citing limited nature of
remedies available under state law as justification for federal copyright pro-
tection of sound recordings); S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10-13 (discussing his-
tory of efforts to gain federal protection for sound recordings).
221 See supra Parts I(A) and I(B).  Just as the Florida statute in Bonito Boats went
beyond any existing state law protections that Congress recognized as being
in “tolerable” tension with federal patent law, Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167,
here any newly-recognized state law protections for digital performances of
sound recordings extend beyond the state law protections for reproduction
and distribution rights in sound recordings that existed in 1976 and that
Congress had in mind when it added § 301(c).  Thus, § 301(c) creates no
presumption that Congress encouraged enforcement of state laws that actu-
ally conflict with subsequent federal copyright policy and objectives regard-
ing digital performance rights in sound recordings.
222 Composed by Gilbert Becaud, Manny Curtis, and Pierre Delanoe; recorded by
the Everly Brothers in 1960.
223 The detailed statutory contours of the § 114 digital performance right and the
requirements for the statutory license on their face reflect this purpose, set-
ting up a narrow class of transmissions that would qualify for the license and
an administrative process for establishing fee structures for the license.  The
legislative history leading up to enactment of the 1995 DPRA also reflects
this purpose. See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-
274, at 14 (1995).  Within copyright jurisprudence, it is common for the
courts to look to the legislative history of the particular provisions of the
Copyright Act to aid in interpretation of the statutory language. See, e.g.,
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (relying heavily
on the legislative history of amendments to the Copyright Act that ad-
dressed transmissions of audiovisual works to interpret statutory language);
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (considering the legislative his-
tory of the attorneys’ fee provision in 17 U.S.C. § 505 in determining
whether prevailing defendants should be considered differently from pre-
vailing plaintiffs in awarding fees to the prevailing party in copyright in-
fringement cases).
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compulsory license to separately negotiate licenses with individual owners
of pre-1972 sound recordings based on a patchwork of differing state laws,
for performances that are not specific to any one state but that are availa-
ble everywhere that a satellite radio or Internet connection exists.  Con-
gress was willing to impose the burden of individual licensing on providers
of interactive digital transmissions because those transmissions were most
likely to deprive copyright owners of revenues from sales.  However, Con-
gress was not willing to impose individual licensing burdens on services
that mimicked terrestrial radio, instead creating the compulsory license to
reduce transaction costs on services that would be competing with broad-
cast radio but paying the statutory license for the newly-created public
performance right.224
Digital public performance rights are thus a narrow category of rights
in sound recordings to which individual states cannot claim a localized in-
terest in regulating that could outweigh the federal interest in an efficient
licensing mechanism for digital streaming services.  Laws governing digital
public performance rights are distinct from those addressing the unautho-
rized physical reproduction of recordings like that analyzed in Goldstein,
in part because laws prohibiting physical copying can be limited in their
effect to the boundaries of the particular state without unduly impacting
the freedom of other states to allow free access to the same works.225 No
such limitation exists for state laws governing digital streaming; to prohibit
a stream in one state means to prohibit it in all states, even those that do
not recognize performance rights in sound recordings.226  And digital
streaming has an even broader reach than the radio broadcasts of sound
recordings addressed in Whiteman.227  Thus, the problem noted by Judge
Hand of limiting the broadcast of recordings to multiple states solely to
avoid violation of one state’s law228 would be magnified many times over,
224 See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15-16 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995).
225 412 U.S. at 558.  Although this reasoning could be argued to be inapplicable to
digital sales through services like iTunes, an analysis of the local interest in
such online activities by individual states is outside of the scope of this arti-
cle.  For a more in-depth discussion of local versus national interests in this
context, see Pulsinelli, supra note 175, at 208-17. R
226 This is analogous to the concern expressed in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 711 (1984), where cable operators were forced with the choice
of either complying with state law but losing the benefits of the compulsory
license or refusing to carry programming that was only banned in
Oklahoma.  In fact, it represents a greater overreaching by the states, in that
the cable services at issue in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. were locally-licensed
franchises that specifically broadcast to Oklahoma residents, but Internet
and satellite radio services are not localized in any one state but are broad-
casting everywhere at once.
227 114 F.2d at 88.
228 Id.
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with streaming services forced to comply with the most restrictive state
laws despite the fact that their streams reach all jurisdictions
simultaneously.
The benefits of a uniform, nation-wide, efficient system envisioned by
Congress in specifying services that would qualify for the compulsory li-
cense would be nullified if non-interactive, radio-like streaming services
were forced to distinguish between individual sound recordings that are
streamed over their services to (1) ascertain the date of recording; (2)
identify the owner of that recording; (3) identify all performers on the
recording who might assert performance rights in it; (4) evaluate whether
the laws of any of the fifty-plus states or U.S. territories provide perform-
ance rights to the owner and/or performers on the recording; and (5) nego-
tiate a license to stream the particular work for a fee that is acceptable to
both the streaming service and the owner/performers.  In other words,
even when a non-interactive streaming service meets the rigorous require-
ments for a statutory license under § 114, it would still be required to
check millions of sound recordings with tens of millions of owners and
performers against fifty-plus state regimes to determine whether any li-
censes were needed beyond the federal statutory license and whether any
payments were required beyond the statutory rate set by the CRJs.
Even those streaming services that have been paying SoundExchange
for their streams of pre-1972 sound recordings could still run afoul of state
laws, because they have not received individual licenses from pre-1972
sound recording owners and because state laws might be interpreted to
require a greater royalty payment than that set by the CRJs. This creates
the same sort of administrative obstacle to the federal scheme that was
found to be intolerable in Bonito Boats, where the Court noted that the
federal patent scheme provided a central location for the public to deter-
mine the status of any article in commerce and scope of protection af-
forded to it and that allowing states to create similar rights in the same
products “would lead to administrative problems of no small
dimension.”229
Moreover, the rate-setting mechanism established by § 114 is de-
signed to accommodate all of the competing concerns involved in non-
interactive streaming of sound recordings, establishing fair compensation
to rights-holders without overburdening the businesses that stream sound
recordings to the public.230  Supplementing the statutory license fees es-
229 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989); see
also Greier, 529 U.S. at 881 (discussing importance of predictability and
uniformity in a nation-wide standard of care).
230 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012); see also In re Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Copyright Royalty
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tablished by the CRJs with obligations under state laws would upset the
balance inherent in the fee-determination process set up by Congress.231
In sum, state law protection of digital performance rights in pre-1972
sound recordings presents an intolerable conflict with the goals of the fed-
eral compulsory licensing system established for digital streaming by ra-
dio-like services in the DPRA and thus is subject to preemption under the
Supremacy Clause.  The result of such preemption is that owners of pre-
1972 sound recordings should be prohibited from relying on state law to
enjoin the use of their recordings by digital streaming services that qualify
for the federal compulsory license or to seek compensation under state
law for such uses.
IV. RESPECT:232 FAIRNESS CONCERNS ABOUT PREEMPTION
There are many good arguments for extending federal copyright pro-
tection to pre-1972 sound recordings.233  There are also good arguments
for limiting or refraining from extending such protection.234  This article
does not enter into that thorny and policy-laden debate; it merely asserts
that state laws purporting to provide protections to pre-1972 sound record-
ings that interfere with the carefully-balanced compulsory license for cer-
tain categories of digital performances of sound recordings should be
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.
Several countervailing policy concerns must be taken into account in
considering the argument that owners of pre-1972 recordings should be
deprived of state law protections for non-interactive digital public per-
formances of their works:  expectation concerns, fairness concerns, and
Board, No. 2009-1 CRB, Webcasting III, Final Determination of Rates and
Terms (Jan. 5, 2011, effective Mar. 9, 2011).
231 Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (preempt-
ing Massachusetts law preventing use of state funds to support companies
that did business with Myanmar because existing federal sanctions against
Myanmar were intended to remain within a specific range and state supple-
mentation of the federal sanctions would frustrate the goals of the federal
legislation).
232 Composed by Otis Redding; recorded by Aretha Franklin in 1967.
233 See, e.g., COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, supra
note 6 at 121; Henry Lee Mann, As Our Heritage Crumbles into Dust:  The
Threat of State Law Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 6 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 45 (2006); Eva E. Subotnik & June M. Besek,
Constitutional Obstacles?  Reconsidering Copyright Protection for Pre-1972
Sound Recordings, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 327, 330-42 (2014); Elizabeth
Townsend Gard & Erin Anapol, Federalizing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings:
An Analysis of the Current Debate, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123
(2012).
234 See, e.g., Subotnik & Besek, supra note 233, at 343-67; Pulsinelli, supra note R
175, at 240-51. R
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scope concerns.  Although the fairness concerns are particularly powerful,
none of these concerns outweighs the very real and substantial interfer-
ence in the complex DPRA compulsory licensing regime that would be
caused by enforcement of state laws protecting digital performance rights.
First, preemption might create expectation concerns.  Owners of pre-
1972 works might have purchased or assigned rights based on anticipated
revenue streams from exploitation of a state law digital public perform-
ance right, and preemption could interfere with those expected revenues.
However, given the lack of any express recognition of a state law digital
performance right before the recent 2014 decisions in the Flo & Eddie
litigation,235 it cannot be said that those expectations were either long-
standing or certain or that they outweigh the strong federal interest in an
efficient and comprehensive compulsory licensing system for digital per-
formances by radio-like services.
Second, preemption would create fairness concerns.  Royalties from
Internet and satellite radio are the only growing revenue stream for own-
ers of sound recordings within the music industry,236 and given the lack of
federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, preemption of state law
digital performance rights would preclude owners of pre-1972 sound re-
cordings from participating in at least part of that revenue stream.  In an
industry where streaming revenues earned by labels and recording artists
are close to surpassing revenues from digital downloads and have already
surpassed revenues from physical sales of records,237 state laws protecting
the reproduction and distribution rights in pre-1972 recordings will be of
decreasing value to owners of those works over time.
However, the substitution concerns that led Congress to create the
digital public performance right in the first place — i.e., that sales of re-
cordings were being replaced by online digital access to sound recordings
— are perhaps less weighty in the context of older sound recordings for
which the owners had many decades in which to sell copies before the
digital revolution began to chisel away the market for sales of records.  All
of these works are already in their fifth decade or more of existence and
presumably benefited from the “golden era” in the recording industry
when revenues were far greater than they are for artists producing record-
235 See supra discussion in Part II.
236 See note 74, infra. R
237 See, e.g., Matthew Garrahan, U.S. Streaming Revenues Overtake CD Sales,
CNBC.COM, (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/18/us-streaming-
revenues-overtake-cd-sales.html (noting that RIAA reports showed 2014
streaming revenues surpassed physical CD sales and were approaching rev-
enues from digital downloads).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CPY\62-4\CPY402.txt unknown Seq: 57 29-OCT-15 15:26
State Law Digital Public Performance Rights 601
ings today.238  The copyright monopoly under both state and federal law
has always been limited, both in time and scope.  Excluding owners of pre-
1972 recordings from the non-interactive digital transmission revenue
stream is not as inequitable as it might seem at first glance when viewed
through a longitudinal lens, because newer artists who receive federal pro-
tection for their recordings are operating in a market where the pie of
total revenues is getting progressively smaller, whereas the owners of
older recordings benefited from a growing market during the decades after
those works were released.
Third, preemption of state law digital public performance rights in
non-interactive digital audio transmissions might raise scope concerns.
Owners and potential licensees of pre-1972 sound recordings might be left
uncertain as to the degree to which other types of performance rights in
pre-1972 works might be affected.  However, the argument for preemption
made here is a narrow one. The federal compulsory license system in place
for digital public performances of sound recordings does not encompass
the full range of digital uses of sound recordings.  It only applies to a nar-
rowly-defined set of transmissions that generally apply to Internet and sat-
ellite radio, and all other uses require individual licenses.239  Enforcement
of state law digital public performance rights by owners of pre-1972 sound
recordings in the context of interactive streaming services like Spotify is
unlikely to be preempted, given that the 1995 DPRA already anticipates
individual licensing negotiations on a recording-by-recording basis. Re-
quiring additional licenses for pre-1972 recordings under state law would
be a relatively small increase in the total burden for interactive services
seeking to obtain licenses from sound recording owners.240 Thus, those
services that meet the strict, narrow requirements of the statutory license
will be protected from state law claims by owners of pre-1972 sound re-
cordings under the conflict preemption analysis undertaken here.  On-de-
mand services will be left to individual negotiations with sound recording
owners for rights to the content, which would not pose the same interfer-
ence with the federal licensing scheme that is presented when services that
do qualify for the statutory license are also required to comply with a myr-
iad of state laws or risk litigation.241
238 See, e.g., Andrea Swensen, Forty Years of Music Sales Data in Two Handy
Charts, THE CURRENT BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014), http://blog.thecurrent.org/
2014/02/40-years-of-album-sales-data-in-one-handy-chart (illustrating in-
creasing revenues from record sales over the period from 1973–1999, with a
subsequent decline every year since 1999).
239 See Part III supra, particularly notes 112-114, 116-126, and accompanying text. R
240 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
241 Supremacy Clause preemption of state laws that are inconsistent with the com-
pulsory licensing provisions of § 114(d)(2) would also not run afoul of the
general canon of statutory interpretation that one section of a statute can-
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Similarly, preemption of state law digital public performance rights
that conflict with the federal compulsory licensing system would have no
impact on state laws protecting pre-1972 sound recordings against unau-
thorized reproduction and distribution, digital or otherwise, other than
ephemeral and other reproductions necessary to facilitate the digital pub-
lic performance right.242  Unless and until Congress implements a compre-
hensive compulsory licensing scheme that affects other state laws
protecting rights in pre-1972 sound recordings, the rationale for conflict
preemption discussed above would be narrowly confined to the use of
sound recordings in non-interactive digital transmissions that qualify for
the § 114(d)(2) compulsory license.243
Ultimately, though, all of the above concerns arise not out of the pre-
emption of state rights that are directly in conflict with federal copyright
law, but out of Congress’ original decision in 1971, reaffirmed in the Copy-
right Act of 1976, to exclude pre-1972 sound recordings from federal pro-
tection.  Inequities resulting from the disparity in treatment between pre-
1972 and post-1972 recordings were an inevitable result of that original
decision, but the growing dominance of digital streaming in the music in-
not be interpreted in a way that effectively repeals another section of the
statute. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978).  Find-
ing state laws preempted only so far as they conflict with the compulsory
license for digital audio streaming would not repeal § 301(c) as a result of
the § 114 compulsory license provision; § 301(c) would remain fully effec-
tive as to any and all state laws that do not fundamentally conflict with the
goals and purposes of specific provisions of the federal copyright act.
242 See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (establishing narrow statutory license for ephemeral
recordings arising out of digital streaming under a § 114 statutory license).
This article presumes, without analyzing in depth, that the same rationale
for conflict preemption of state law performance right claims that applies to
digital streaming under a § 114 statutory license would apply to claims
based on state law arising out of ephemeral copying covered under the
§ 112 license.
243 The rationale for preemption of state law rights affecting transmissions that
qualify for the statutory license under § 114(d)(2) might also support pre-
emption of state law rights affecting transmissions that are exempt from any
licensing under § 114(d)(1).  Just as the language and history of the patent
laws demonstrated an express intent by Congress to leave some categories
of works that might be subject to the patent monopoly free for the public to
use that justified preemption of conflicting state laws in Sears and Compco,
see supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text, § 114’s creation of catego- R
ries of digital public performances that are exempt from any licensing could
be found to demonstrate an express intent by Congress to leave those types
of uses free for public use.  Because preemption analysis requires careful
consideration of the particular statutory provisions at issue and the poten-
tial conflict created by state laws, and because no state laws have yet been
asserted that would impose liability on exempt transmissions under § 114, a
full analysis of that question is outside the scope of this article.
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dustry has exacerbated those inequities.  It is thus not surprising that both
owners of pre-1972 sound recordings and individual states have been seek-
ing ways to ensure that legacy works are included in this growing revenue
stream.  However, remedies based solely upon state law would be incon-
sistent, perhaps contradictory, and incompatible with the objectives of the
federal statutory license.  These concerns can and should all be addressed
by Congress, in a context in which it can carefully consider and balance the
competing interests already reflected in the 1995 DPRA, as well as the
equitable concerns regarding compensation to owners of pre-1972 sound
recordings (and to the artists who created them), the expectations of those
who might have licensed those works, and the scope of protection that
might be provided to those works.
In fact, over the past several years, bills have been introduced in Con-
gress to address these issues and the Copyright Office has engaged in a
detailed study of the issues raised by possible federal protection of pre-
1972 sound recordings.244  Last year, Congress introduced H.R. 4772,
known as the “RESPECT Act,” which would have brought pre-1972
sound recordings within the ambit of the §§ 114 and 112 compulsory li-
censes for purposes of compensation without providing federal copyright
protection to those works, immunizing any digital streaming services that
paid the statutory license fee from any state law claims based on the use of
the sound recordings.245  Similar provisions were incorporated into the re-
cently introduced Fair Pay, Fair Play Act of 2015, which provides that its
objective is “to provide fair treatment of radio stations and artists for the
use of sound recordings.”246  Although the Fair Pay, Fair Play Act focuses
244 See, e.g., H.R. 4772 (113th Cong. 2014); COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKET-
PLACE, supra note 5.  The February 2015 Copyright Office Report on Copy-
right and the Music Marketplace expressly recommended that pre-1972
sound recordings be brought under federal copyright protection, noting,
“The lack of federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings impedes a fair
marketplace.  Record labels and artists are not paid for performances of
these works by digital services, which (at least until recent court rulings
under state law) were considered free from copyright liability on the sound
recording side.” COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 5,
Executive Summary at 3.
245 Respecting Senior Performers as Essential Cultural Treasures Act, H.R. 4772,
113th Cong. (2014).
246 H.R. 1733, 114th Cong. (2015). This bill is reminiscent of the 1909 Copyright
Act’s attempt to deal with composer’s rights in mechanical reproductions of
compositions by providing for a statutory license without providing copy-
right protection to the particular recording of the composition.  See 17
U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 563-66.  Some argue that it does
not go far enough, but it would provide some recompense to owners of pre-
1972 sound recordings for digital radio streams of their works without hav-
ing to wrestle with the more difficult questions about bringing previously
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primarily on parity among different radio station platforms (including ter-
restrial radio, webcasting, satellite radio, and personalized streaming radio
stations), section 7 would require digital audio transmission services that
qualify for the statutory license to pay owners and creators of pre-1972
recordings in the same manner as they do post-1972 recordings.247  It
would also immunize services that make those payments from liability
under any state laws that might be claimed to protect public performance
rights in pre-1972 recordings, but it expressly refrains from providing fed-
eral copyright protection to those works.248
One possible remedy at the state level might be adoption of a uniform
state law that requires digital audio transmission services that qualify for
the § 114 statutory license to pay for performances of pre-1972 sound re-
cordings in the same manner that federal law requires for performances of
post-1972 sound recordings — essentially the mirror image of the Fair Pay,
Fair Play Act’s provision of immunity against state law liability for per-
formances of pre-1972 recordings if the statutory license fee is paid by
services that qualify for it.  Certainly, the adoption by such a law by a
majority of states would avoid some of the conflict justifying preemption
discussed in Part III(B), supra.  Some conflict with the federal licensing
scheme would still exist, because streaming services would still carry the
additional burden, beyond compliance with the federal statutory license,
of having to determine which pre-1972 recordings are protected by which
state laws.  That problem could potentially be addressed by provisions in
the uniform state law that would require owners of pre-1972 recordings to
register their works in a way that provides notice to streaming services of a
claim to the protection of a particular state’s laws for those recordings.
There still, however, would be a question as to whether requiring a quali-
fying service to do any more than the federal statutory license requires
would create an obstacle to the proper functioning of the § 114 license.
And the rate-setting process could be undermined even with a uniform
state law, because the effect of such state laws on the total license fees to
be paid by individual services would be hard for the CRJs to measure and
factor into the balance of interests unless and until all fifty states had en-
acted those laws.
The most effective solution for addressing fairness and scope concerns
in a way that does not interfere with the objectives of the § 114 statutory
licensing regime is for Congress to act.  Passage of the provisions of the
Fair Pay, Fair Play Act of 2015 relating to digital performances of pre-1972
sound recordings could provide an effective remedy for the concerns dis-
unprotected works under the umbrella of federal protection that are outside
the scope of this article.
247 Id. § 7(a).
248 Id.
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cussed above that were created by the congressional decision to protect
only post-1972 recordings and that could be exacerbated by preemption of
state laws governing digital public performances.  In fact, a judicial finding
of Supremacy Clause preemption of such state law claims might spur Con-
gress to act more expeditiously in dealing with the problem it created
when it exempted pre-1972 sound recordings from federal copyright.
Rather than leaving individual state courts or legislatures to fashion reme-
dies that hinder the goals of the compulsory licensing system for digital
public performances of sound recordings, Congress should address the
competing arguments and whether they merit amendments to the carefully
balanced compulsory licensing system adopted in 1995.
V. AT LAST249 – CONCLUSION
Nothing in this article is intended to minimize the cultural and artistic
importance of sound recordings that were made before 1972.  However,
Supremacy Clause preemption of just the narrow category of digital public
performance rights addressed in this article — digital streams that meet
the requirements for the limited compulsory license under § 114 — does
not leave owners of pre-1972 sound recordings without any protection.
They may still protect their works under state law against illegal reproduc-
tion and distribution, including unlicensed digital downloads.  State laws
protecting interactive digital audio transmissions are also unlikely to be
preempted given Congress’ willingness to allow individual licensing for
those uses of sound recordings.
So long as pre-1972 recordings receive no federal copyright protection
and are excluded from the federal compulsory licensing regime, efforts by
individual states to provide compensation to those artists and their record
labels for non-interactive digital performances of their works will likely
pose too great a conflict with the federal statutory license regime to be
permitted.  State-by-state litigation and legislation not only interferes with
the goals of the federal statutory license, but it also risks harm to all artists
and to the listening public if non-interactive streaming services are
overburdened and opt to eliminate access to these works or are unable to
sustain their services.  Supremacy Clause preemption alone would be suffi-
cient to keep the well-loved recordings of Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley,
Etta James, and hundreds of other recording artists whose records were
made before February 15, 1972, available to the public through Internet
and satellite radio services, but it would leave the owners and performers
249 Composed by Mack Gordon and Harry Warren in 1941, At Last was recorded
by Etta James in 1961, and her recording of the song was inducted into the
Grammy Hall of Fame in 1999. Grammy Hall of Fame, GRAMMY.ORG,
http://www.grammy.org/recording-academy/awards/hall-of-fame (last
visited Mar. 19, 2015).
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of those works uncompensated for those performances.  The question of
whether and how compensation might be provided for radio-like stream-
ing of pre-1972 sound recordings should thus be addressed by Congress.
In evaluating that question, Congress should of course take into considera-
tion the competing interests that it balanced in enacting the 1995 DPRA
and in crafting the statutory license.  However, it should also consider the
rising popularity of streaming as a substitute for sales of music and the
economic effect of precluding the owners and performers of pre-1972
sound recordings from this revenue stream, recognizing the importance of
many of these works to our nation’s cultural heritage.
